The Acquisitions Proposals and Their Effect on Corporations, Shareholders and Creditors: Reform of Reorganizations and Liquidations by Faber, Peter L. & LeDuc, John Andre
THE ACQUISITIONS PROPOSALS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON
CORPORATIONS, SHAREHOLDERS





Many of the basic concepts of our present federal income tax sys-
tem were developed in the early part of this century. While Con-
gress, the Treasury Department, and the courts have continuously
attempted to address persistently complex transactions that have
evolved over the past several decades, no concerted effort has been
made to re-examine the fundamental rules and policies of the in-
come tax system for at least thirty years.
As a result of this neglect, transactions among corporations and
their investors have been governed simultaneously by premises car-
ried over from our early tax system and by a series of patch-quilt
amendments to the corporate provisions, many of which are incon-
sistent with the recurring themes of our general tax laws.
Peter Faber, in this opening presentation, sets the stage for our
debate on the need for reform of our present system by summariz-
ing some basic principles of current law, together with the excep-
tions (and exceptions to the exceptions) that developed piece-meal
over the years.
One major premise of current law is that each corporation is a
separate taxpayer even if it is part of a group of corporations
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owned by the same individual or another corporation, no matter
how integrated their operations (consolidated tax returns of certain
related corporations are voluntary). Yet, divisions or branches of
the same corporation are not separate tax entities, even where their
operations are not intergrated. Other assumptions of the present
system include: (1) Mere appreciation in value of property is not a
taxable event, yet in some instances a corporation is taxable on a
distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders; (2) "Capi-
tal" gain is taxed at lower rates, yet there is no uniform definition
of circumstances when lower rates are available; (3) As a general
rule, transactions are taxed according to their substance, not form,
yet minor changes in form can often produce major changes in tax
result (e.g., in corporate acquisitions); (4) Tax history and attrib-
utes of one corporation (or other taxpayer) cannot be transferred to
another, yet complex exceptions abound; (5) A corporation is the
only type of business or entity that is subjected to double-tax bur-
dens (often only in theory, however)-partnerships and sole proprie-
torships are not taxed separately from owners; (6) Changes in
shareholders do not affect the corporation, yet net operating loss
carryovers are reduced or lost if certain changes in shareholders oc-
cur, and change of control of the same corporation (where, for ex-
ample, it is purchased by another corporation) may permit a step-
up in basis of the acquired corporation's assets; (7) Transfers of
property by shareholders to a controlled corporation generally are
not taxable events to either shareholders or corporations, yet liqui-
dations of corporations generally are not taxable events to the cor-
poration, but are taxable to shareholders (with some exceptions);
(8) Current distributions from corporations to shareholders are gen-
erally taxed as dividends to shareholders, subject to elusive "earn-
ings and profits" definition, yet the corporation is not taxed (with
many exceptions) on a distribution of appreciated property; (9)
"Tax-free" corporate acquisitions are subject to myriad require-
ments, some of which are still in dispute. Judicial gloss on statu-
tory rules generates significant litigation.
While Peter Faber's discussion does make the case for re-exami-
nation of Subchapter C (and other portions of the tax law), the bal-
ance of this symposium will demonstrate the enormous task and
wide-spread debate in choosing the most acceptable course to
follow.
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS: PREMISES OF THE
PRESENT SYSTEM
PETER L. FABER*
Much of this conference may seem rather theoretical, but we all
have an obligation to think about the kinds of issues that are going
to be presented in the next two days. If those of us in this room don't
think about them, other people will not. Moreover, ideas that may
seem theoretical today may become the laws which we all have to
deal with on a subsection-by-subsection basis tomorrow. I'm de-
lighted to see all of you here and I feel that this will be a very pro-
ductive conference for all of us.
We are going to be talking at this conference about proposed
changes in the tax law but my presentation deals more with what we
now have. Before we talk about how to change the present system,
we should analyze it and discuss its theoretical premises. The word
"premises" may be misleading, because "premise" suggests a logical
construct - a very well-organized tightly structured thing that has a
basis in logic and theory. I think that we will find as I talk about
exceptions and exceptions to exceptions that the tax law today is per-
haps not quite as tightly structured as a Mozart string quartet, but
perhaps a bit more tightly structured than my law firm.
First, I will discuss some concepts that apply to taxation in gen-
eral. I will then move to concepts that underlie the structure of Sub-
chapter C, dealing with the taxation of corporations and sharehold-
ers. Finally, I will discuss some of the premises of the system under
which we tax corporate mergers and acquisitions.
* Attorney, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler, New York; A.B.,
Swarthmore College; LL.B., Harvard Law School.
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One general proposition of present law is that entities which are
separate legal entities under local law are treated as separate tax-
payers. Even though several corporations are all owned by the same
people, conduct the same business, and operate out of the same of-
fice, they will nevertheless be treated as separate taxpayers no mat-
ter how integrated their operations. The consolidated return rules al-
low taxpayers to combine and treat related corporations as one for
many purposes. This is optional; the Internal Revenue Service can-
not compel consolidation. This can be contrasted with the system in
many states under which the taxing authorities have the power to
force consolidated returns on Corporations that are related by stock
ownership and integrated business activity.
The flipside of the emphasis on legal entities is that things which
are not legal entities are generally not treated as separate taxpayers.
Thus, a corporate division, no matter how different its operations
may be from the other divisions of the corporation, ordinarily is not
treated as a separate taxpayer. To move from the corporate context,
ordinarily individuals in the same family are treated as separate tax-
payers. A husband and wife voluntarily may file joint returns and be
treated as one taxpayer for many purposes, but the IRS cannot com-
pel them to do this. One thing that has always struck me as being
curious is that minor dependent children (no matter how young) are
always treated as separate taxpayers. They generally are not treated
as part of the same family economic unit for tax purposes, even
though clearly they are for just about every other purpose until they
become old enough to rebel.
The concept of a business is not wholly irrelevant in the tax laws.
One example that often comes up is the bulk inventory sale rule of
Code section 337, dealing with corporate liquidations. Although or-
dinarily inventory does not qualify for section 337 protection, if a
corporation sells all of the inventory of a trade or business to one
buyer in one transaction and then liquidates, the sale is tax-free to
the corporation. It need not sell all of its inventory, but just all of the
inventory of a "trade or business."
Another general principle of our tax system is that income is taxa-
ble only when a recognition event of some kind occurs. The mere
appreciation in value of property is generally not a taxable event,
although the (mark to market) rules of Code section 1256 are an
exception to that principle.' A transfer of property in exchange for
other property is generally a recognition event, again with excep-
tions. Under section 1031, for example, gain is not recognized if cer-
tain property is traded for property of a like-kind. Recognition
1. Section 1256 taxes unrecognized gain on regulated futures contracts held (but
not yet sold) by the taxpayer at year end.
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events must be defined. You will hear much about the General Utili-
ties principle in this conference. One of the big issues of our day in
the corporate tax area is whether the distribution of appreciated
property by a corporation to its shareholders should be a recognition
event. This is one area where the pending legislation does have some-
thing to say.
Another general principle of the current tax system is that capital
gains under some circumstances should be taxed at a lower rate than
ordinary income. One rationale for this preference is an attempt to
avoid the lumping together in one taxable year of gain which had
accrued over a period of time. Immense complexity has resulted
from the attempt to separate long-time capital gains from ordinary
income. It is necessary to decide what assets qualify for capital gain
treatment and how long they have to be held (that too is now being
considered by Congress).2 If the purpose of preferential treatment
for long-term capital gains is to provide a kind of income averaging,
it is not clear why capital gain treatment should be available to peo-
ple in the top tax bracket, since their income that accrued each year
would have been taxed in the top bracket anyway, but, Congress has
always seen fit to give the capital gains break to everyone.
Another general concept of our present system is that the form of
a transaction, as long as it reflects the transaction's substance, will
determine its tax consequences. Here again, there are many excep-
tions to the rule. One, which I would call statutory electivity, can be
seen in section 338 of the Code. Under prior law, a corporation that
bought stock of another corporation in order to get a stepped-up ba-
sis for the target's assets had to liquidate the target under section
334(b)(2). Under section 338, a corporation can buy another corpo-
ration's stock and step up the basis of the target's assets simply by
checking a box on a piece of paper that is filed with the IRS. If the
box is not checked, a step-up in basis is not available. Thus, different
tax treatment is available to the same form of transaction.
The system also has what might be called transactional electivity.
The tax consequences of a transaction can be changed by a minute
change in form. One example that comes to mind is the relationship
between "B" reorganizations and reverse subsidiary mergers. If a
corporation wants to acquire another corporation's stock in an ex-
change offer, tax-free treatment is ordinarily available under Code
section 368(a)(1)(B) only if the sole consideration is the voting stock
2. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001 (a)(1), 98 Stat.
494, 1011 (1984), reduced the holding period from one year to six months.
of the buyer or its parent. If the buyer had previously bought some
stock in the target for cash, there may be a danger that the prior
transaction will be stepped together with the later transaction so that
the cash consideration will disqualify the overall transaction from
tax-free treatment. If the buyer cannot sell the previously acquired
stock, the same net result can be obtained by having the acquiring
company form a subsidiary and merge the subsidiary into the target
in a reverse-subsidiary merger under Code section 368(a)(2)(E),
where there can be some non-stock consideration. The substance of
that transaction is really the same as if the acquiring company sim-
ply had acquired the stock of the target in an exchange offer and,
indeed, in Revenue Ruling 67-448, the IRS had held before
368(a)(2)(E) came into the law that a reverse subsidiary merger
could qualify as a "B" reorganization.3
Another exception to the general rule that form controls tax con-
sequences is the effect of motive on tax consequences. Under section
269, if a corporation's primary purpose in effecting an acquisition
was to get certain tax benefits, it will not get them. If its primary
purpose was not to get those benefits, it will get them even though
the form of the transaction was the same.
Another general principle is that expenses that produce benefits
over more than one taxable year generally should be capitalized and
cannot be deducted all at once. Here, too, there are exceptions. Ex-
penses for advertising, for example, which people hope will produce
benefits that go beyond one year are deductible. If one reads the old
cases from the 1920's that generally are cited in support of this pro-
position, one concludes that they have been misinterpreted, but the
principle that advertising is deductible is well established even
though it can be shown that the benefit carries over more than one
year.4
I would like at this point to turn to some general concepts that
primarily affect net operating loss carryovers. I will discuss them
here because they are concepts that apply to the tax system in gen-
eral and I am grouping them together because it happens that they
all affect the treatment of net operating loss carryovers.
One of the concepts is that tax should be imposed only on some
form of net income. We do not have a gross receipts tax at the fed-
eral level. Complexity results from the decision to have a net income
tax. One has to define gross income and then decide what to subtract
from gross income to get net income. If we were building a pure tax
system, we probably would allow as deductions from gross income
3. 1967-2 C.B. 144.
4. The cases involve situations in which the taxpayers were arguing that the ex-
penses should have been capitalized and the courts held that they failed to meet this
burden of proof.
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only the cost of producing that gross income such as business ex-
penses and expenses now deductible under section 212. On the other
hand, nothing is pure in the tax law, as in everything else, and the
Code contains a variety of provisions that are intended as incentives
to induce some sort of social or economic behavior. Some of those
incentives reduce tax liability. Some, like ACRS (Accelerated Cost
Recovery System, enacted in 1981), accelerate tax deductions and in
theory do not reduce overall tax liability, although by giving taxpay-
ers deductions early their overall burden is certainly reduced below
what it would be if they got their deductions later on. The irony of
incentives that take the form of deductions is that the government
subsidy that results is much greater for a rich person than for a poor
person. It seems rather odd that if, for example, a wealthy person in
the 50% bracket gives $100 to his church he gets a government sub-
sidy of $50, whereas a factory worker who gives the same amount to
his church gets a government subsidy of only $25. It might be more
logical to take all of the now deductible items that are not related to
the cost of producing income, add them up, get a total figure for all,
and then give every taxpayer a flat credit against tax for a fixed
percentage of those items (e.g. 25%). Then, the government subsidy
for all of these items would be the same and would depend only on
the extent to which the taxpayer engaged in the subsidized activity.
Such a system has not yet come into the law, and it probably never
will.
Another general premise which particularly affects net operating
loss carryovers is that the existence of net income should be com-
puted based on a discrete fiscal period. Taxpayers do not keep a run-
ning account with the government that goes on forever. There are
taxable periods with a beginning and an end. At the end of that
period, the taxpayer looks at everything that happened in the period,
computes net income, and applies a tax rate to the net figure. Con-
gress has also determined that the taxable period should be one year.
There is nothing particularly sacred about this. Other taxable peri-
ods, those for employment taxes for example, use the calendar quar-
ter. There is no particular reason why taxable income should be
keyed to the amount of time that it takes the earth to go around the
sun, but that is what our present system does.
Another assumption of our system is that, even though we do base
net income on a fiscal period, there ought to be some kind of mecha-
nism for leveling out distortions that might result because one fiscal
period is unusual. When the unusual year is a loss year, the mecha-
nism in the corporate system is the availability of net operating loss
carryforwards and carrybacks. When the distortion results from an
unusually profitable year, there is no such mechanism in the corpo-
rate system. Individuals can use a limited type of income-averaging.'
Another general principle that affects net operating losses is that
tax attributes should stay where they are and should not be trans-
ferred from one corporation to another. A variety of exceptions to
this rule are set forth in section 381 of the Code. Generally speaking,
in order to transfer a tax attribute from one company to another
there must be a transaction in which gain is not recognized. The two
concepts are linked. The result of this under section 381 can be that
a technical failure to qualify for tax exemption on a sale (for exam-
ple because of a small amount of "boot" in a "C" reorganization),
can not only make the transaction taxable but also prevent net oper-
ating loss carryovers and other tax attributes from passing from the
target corporation to the acquiring corporation.
We had briefly a marvelous bit of legislation, the safe-harbor lease
provisions, that were designed specifically to enable taxpayers to sell
tax benefits. We found that this became politically unpopular and it
did not last long. Congress obviously felt ambivalent about transfer-
ring tax attributes as was illustrated in the move to repeal the safe-
harbor lease provisions. Congress is willing to let taxpayers transfer
tax benefits a little bit but not too much. As a result, we have the
objective limits on the transfer of net operating loss carryovers in
section 382 and the subjective limits on the transfer of just about
everything in section 269.
Let me move on to some concepts underlying the general structure
of Subchapter C of the Code.
The first one is that there ought to be a corporate income tax - a
proposition which we very often take for granted. President Reagan
in an unguarded moment a year or so ago stated that this might not
be such a wonderful idea but cooler heads quickly prevailed. It be-
came clear that abolishing taxes on Shell Oil and General Motors in
a presidential election year would be unlikely. We do have a corpo-
rate income tax and we are likely to have one for some time, al-
though if we were designing a tax system from scratch we might
choose not to have one.
The corporation seems to be the only business entity that is sub-
ject to a full unintegrated tax. Partnerships and sole proprietorships
are not taxed, at least for federal income tax purposes. If you prac-
tice law in New York City, as I do, you will know that there are
5. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 173(a) 98 Stat. 494, 703
(1984), further restricted individual averaging by increasing from 120% to 140% the
amount by which the current year's income must exceed the average of the prior three
years. Act Sec. 173(a).
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some jurisdictions that do levy a tax on unincorporated entities, but
the federal government does not. Trusts and estates are taxed but
they can avoid the tax by distributing or being required to distribute
income to their beneficiaries, so the tax on trusts is not quite as oner-
ous. It is interesting to note that when the corporate tax was first
enacted in 1909 it was not part of a two-tier tax system. That was in
the interim period between income taxes, and there was no individ-
ual income tax at the time.
Another assumption of our system is that there should be a share-
holder level tax on corporate income but only, in most cases, when
that income is distributed. A corporation has a separate existence
apart from its shareholders. In general, changes in the shareholdings
of a corporation do not affect the taxation of the corporation. Again,
there are exceptions. Under section 382, a change in shareholdings
can result in a loss of net operating loss carryovers even though they
do not result in the corporation being treated as a new corporation.
For example, changes in shareholdings that would be enough to kill
netoperating loss carryovers under section 382(a) do not enable the
corporation to elect new accounting methods as if it were a new cor-
poration. Another exception to the general rule is that, under section
338, a corporation can step-up the basis in its assets if the sharehold-
ings change to a certain extent.
Our system also assumes that there should be a full two-tier tax
structure in which both corporations and shareholders are subject to
tax on their shares of income from what is basically one business
enterprise. The consolidated return rules and the dividends received
deduction offer some relief from the double tax, and there is much
practical relief as well. You will hear more about the double tax
later in this program. One exception to it occurs if a corporation sells
assets and then liquidates under section 337. The corporate level tax
is waived for the most part and there is only a single shareholder
level tax on the transaction. On the other hand, if the corporation
had sold the same assets, stayed in existence as a holding company,
and liquidated five years later, that gain would be subject to a full
double tax. There are many people who feel that this is an inconsis-
tency which is not terribly logical; there are others, including some
distinguished speakers on this program, who disagree with that pro-
position, and this will contribute to the debate as we go on in the
next few days.6
6. See A.B.A. Task Force Report, Income Taxation of Corporations Making
Distributions with Respect to their Stock, 37 TAX LAW. 625 (1984).
The double tax is often more theoretical than real. Everyone who
has advised closely held corporations has gone through the process of
zeroing out the corporation's tax by paying bonuses, large contribu-
tions to profit sharing plans, and so forth, so that the corporate level
tax is substantially eliminated. The shareholder level tax often can
be eliminated by simply retaining earnings in the corporation and
distributing them in the form of redemptions or in liquidation after
shareholders die when the basis of their stock is stepped up under
section 1014 - a provision that does not have too much logic, but as
we saw a few years ago it has a lot of political support in Congress.
The accumulated earnings tax of section 531 is intended to be a po-
licing measure against this type of manipulation, but in my experi-
ence it has been a rather ineffective one.
There are a variety of ways of integrating the corporate-share-
holder tax, and I am not going to go through them all here. They all
contain some rather serious problems. A committee of the New York
State Bar Association Tax Section did a study of possible forms of
integration a few years ago. The members of the committee were
rather inclined towards integration at the outset, but they concluded
after studying the matter that it might be more trouble than it was
worth.7
Another principle of Subchapter C is that a shareholder's interest
in corporate stock is a separate asset with its own independent char-
acteristics. A sale of stock is taxed with regard to the nature of the
investment of the stock in the shareholder's hands and without re-
gard to the nature of the underlying assets of the corporation. The
collapsible corporation rules are an exception to this general princi-
ple. In the partnership area, section 751 results in sales of partner-
ship interests being taxed to some extent based on the assets of the
partnership.
The law contains some assumptions relating to transferring prop-
erty in and out of a corporation. Generally speaking, the formation
of a corporation is a tax-free event to the transferor-shareholders
under section 351. The liquidation of a corporation is a taxable event
to the shareholders under section 331. There is an obvious lack of
symmetry here. There are exceptions to the gain recognition to
shareholders on liquidation. Section 333 contains one when a corpo-
ration without earnings, profits, and certain liquid assets is liqui-
dated in one month. The liquidation of a controlled subsidiary is not
a taxable event to the shareholder under section 332. One can say
that section 332 makes sense because the assets stay in corporate
solution, but, if that is the rationale, the distribution of assets in liq-
7. N.Y.S.B.A. Tax Section Committee on Corporations, Report on the Integra-
tion of Corporate and Individual IncomeTaxes, 31 TAX LAW. 37 (1977).
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uidation to any corporate shareholder ought to be tax-free, whether
or not it controls the liquidating corporation. Congress has not gone
that far. With a few exceptions, the liquidating corporation generally
does not recognize gain.
Another principle of our system is that current distributions from
a corporation are ordinary income to shareholders to the extent of
the corporation's "earnings and profits" - a wonderful phrase that
no one quite knows the meaning of. It is immaterial whether the
earnings were taxed to the corporation as ordinary income or, for
that matter, whether they were taxed to the corporation at all. Cur-
rent distributions are treated as a return of capital only to the extent
that they exceed earnings and profits. There is nothing particularly
essential or logically necessary about our system of taxing current
distributions. It would be perfectly logical to say that distributions
are ordinary income only to the extent that they represented ordi-
nary income received by the corporation, not tax-free income. It
would also be perfectly logical to say that distributions should be
fully taxable as ordinary income even if the corporation had no earn-
ings and profits at all. This is another subject about which you will
hear more.
Generally speaking, a distribution from a corporation to share-
holders is not a recognition event to the corporation. This is what has
come to be known as the General Utilities principle, although one
can argue that the General Utilities case really did not involve that
particular issue.8 Nevertheless, what is important is not what we are
but how we are perceived, and that is certainly how General Utilities
has been perceived over the years. There are many exceptions to the
General Utilities principle in the statute. So many circumstances
under which a corporation making distributions with respect to its
stock will have to recognize gain are set forth that it is not clear
what is the rule and what are the exceptions. Nevertheless, the prin-
ciple, to the extent that it is there, is central to much of the structure
of Subchapter C. It is interesting that Professor Wolfman, from
whom you will hear later today, begins his excellent casebook on
corporate/shareholder taxation with the General Utilities case and
builds everything upon that, and I think that that is a logical ap-
proach to the subject.
Finally, I would like to get into some of the assumptions of our
rules on corporate acquisitions. One of the premises of these rules is
8. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
that the sale of property ought generally to be an income recognition
event. This is true even though, if you think about it, the sale itself
does not produce income if the sale is on fair terms and the price
represents the value of the property. The net worth of the seller does
not increase one dime by the sale. What the system does is to say
that the sale is an occasion for recognizing income that has previ-
ously accrued, perhaps over many years.
Income on the gain normally is recognized without regard to the
nature of the consideration received. Here again, there are excep-
tions. One exception is contained in section 1031, dealing with like-
kind exchanges. There is another general kind of exception when the
consideration enables the seller to retain an interest in the trans-
ferred property (e.g., under the corporate reorganization rules, under
section 351 on the formation of a corporation, and under section 721
on the formation of a partnership).
Income normally is recognized on a sale without regard to what
the seller does with the consideration after he receives it. The trans-
action is deemed to be closed at the time of the sale. Here again,
there are many exceptions. If a taxpayer sells his principal personal
residence and reinvests the proceeds in another principal residence,
gain is deferred. There is a similar provision under section 1033 for
involuntary conversions. In the corporate reorganization area, the
IRS has contended, at least in certain circumstances, that sharehold-
ers of the target corporation can cause the transaction to lose con-
tinuity of interest and hence not be a reorganization if, pursuant to a
prearranged plan, they sell their stock of the acquiring corporation
immediately afterwards. The experts disagree as to whether this is
good law. The McDonald's case has been interpreted as standing for
that proposition, but it is not at all clear that it does because there
the sale was prearranged by the buyer of the business and the case
arguably involved the sale of the buiyer's stock by the buyer followed
by a payment of the cash proceeds to the target shareholders.9 In
any event, this is one area where there is controversy at least over
the possibility that a failure to retain consideration may affect the
tax consequences of the initial transaction.
The system assumes that some sales of businesses should qualify
for tax-free treatment. It also assumes that tax-free sales of busi-
nesses should be limited to a sale of substantially all of the corpora-
tion's assets or stock. There is no reason why a corporation should
not be able to sell all the assets of a division that is itself a self-
contained business, receive solely stock or voting stock of the acquir-
ing corporation, and have that transaction be tax-free, but that is not
9. McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois, Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'g 76 T.C. 972 (1981).
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what the law says. There are ways of getting around this problem in
some circumstances. If you use a statutory merger, you can spin-off
a division beforehand although this cannot be done if you use a "C"
reorganization. Generally speaking, however, a corporation must be
sold in its entirety for the transaction to be tax-free. This encourages
subdividing a business into many different corporations so that seg-
ments of the business can be sold tax-free. There is no requirement
in the reorganization provisions that the corporation which is trans-
ferred conduct a self-contained business and the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise rules do not require this.
Another premise of our law is that the test for determining tax-
free treatment should depend on the target corporation or its share-
holders retaining a continued interest in the business through owner-
ship of stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent. This require-
ment is reflected both in the statute and in the continuity of interest
and continuity of business enterprise rules that appear (arguably) in
the case law and certainly in the regulations. This principle does not
require that any particular part of the business be reflected in con-
tinued ownership or that there be any proportionate ownership test. I
once represented a family that sold a motel to IT & T. This motel
was worth a few hundred thousand dollars and it just happened that
the family received stock of IT & T instead of cash. As a result, it
was a tax-free deal for them, even though obviously their ownership
of IT & T stock was very different qualitatively from the prior own-
ership of the motel. The law has chosen not to separate out that type
of transaction from otherwise qualifying tax-free reorganizations.
Another principle of our system is that tax-free treatment should
depend on meeting tests at the transaction or corporate level. Thus,
even a target shareholder who receives only stock in exchange for his
own stock will be fully taxed on that transaction if the overall trans-
action fails to qualify as a corporate reorganization, a lesson which
our friend Mrs. Kass found out to her sorrow a few years ago.10
There are provisions in the Senate Finance Committee staff propos-
als that would change all that, and many of us think that it might
not be a bad idea.
Another general principle of current law is that changes in asset
basis generally should be linked to the recognition of gain to the
transferor. Here again there are exceptions; General Utilities pro-
vides a few big ones. The step-up in basis at death is another exam-
10. Kass v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), a~fd without opinion, 491 F.2d 749 (3d
Cir. 1974).
pie of an asset basis change which is not accompanied by a recogni-
tion of gain to someone else.
Let me conclude at this point. I think that it is clear that the
system that we have is a philosophically imperfect one. For every
principle, there are at least five exceptions. There are, nevertheless,
common threads that run through the system, and in the remainder
of this conference we will be discussing whether and how that system
ought to be changed. As the discussions go on, try to keep in mind
some of the assumptions that have been made in constructing the
present system, and remember that they didn't have to be made -
that there are other alternatives to choose from.
CURRENT PROPOSALS TO RESTRUCTURE




This paper seeks a framework within which to construct a tenta-
tive answer to the question that this entire conference is about: Must
corporate and shareholder income be taxed complexly? The answer
to that question, if any, may either be intellectual (substantive) or
political (procedural). (That dichotomy between the intellectual and
the political is intended here only as an analytical tool, employed to
help distinguish two kinds of discourse about corporate tax reform).
The taxation of corporations and shareholders may entail irreducible
complexities. There may be no intellectual solutions. Alternatively,
there may be intellectual solutions which would provide substantial
simplification if adopted, but which cannot be achieved politically.
To create a framework to analyze the necessity for complexity in
taxation of corporations and shareholders, we .therefore have to look
at the problem on both the substantive and procedural planes.
That framework, as it relates specifically to corporate acquisitions
and distributions, is constructed in four steps. First, the article takes
the complexity of the present law as an express but unproven (here)
premise. In so doing, I rely on a number of demonstrations of that
* A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author is presently
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complexity.' But note that that premise is by no means uncontrover-
sial.2 Second, the article briefly describes the prior efforts which
promised to reform the principal rules for taxing corporations and
shareholders (Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended) briefly. Almost without exception, those proposals have
failed to produce the improvements promised, and the intellectual
landscape is now littered with the prior efforts of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Tax Section, the American Law Institute (ALI),
and others.' Third, the proposals made by the staff of the Committee
on Finance of the United States Senate in its Preliminary Report on
the Reform and Simplification of the Federal Income Taxation of
Corporations are briefly described.4 Fourth, the intellectual, theoret-
ical, and political responses to the proposals are briefly described.
With those four steps completed, the moral of the story may possibly
be extracted. At the least, we may obtain a preview of the future
installments.
1. See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project; Subchapter C 32
(1982) (William D. Andrews, Reporter) [hereinafter cited as ALI Report], STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION
OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 27-39, (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter
cited as SFC REPORT], see also Comm. on Tax Policy, New York State Bar Ass'n, A
Report on Complexity & the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325 (1972); Frank, Eustice,
Ruecker, & Wainess, Tax Policy: Is Real Simplification Possible? A Panel Discussion,
36 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1531 (1978):
Sometimes I suspect that what's been happening in the evolution of tax law is
that some of the draftsmen who are actually writing the law or drafting it,
whether they are in Congress or their assistants or what, are carried away with
their own ability and their love of tinkering, the same tinkering that a car buff
does when he gets to toying with his engine and fine tuning it and adding an-
other little gadget to the machine. Little gadgets are added to it and they're all
very nice. If you're a craftsmen and if you work with that and only that particu-
lar engine, that's all right, but as the Code has developed it's gotten top heavy
with these little gadgets and it may well be time to look at it section by section,
and decide whether or not you need all these complexities.
36 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1539 (statement of Walter Frank).
2. See, e.g., Hawkins, A Discussion on the Repeal of General Utilities, 37 TAX
LAW. 641 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Revised Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter C on Corpo-
rate Distributions and Adjustments (1958); ABA Tax Section Recommendation No.
1981-5, 34 TAX LAW. 1386 (1981); ABA Tax Section Recommendation No. 1979-4, 32
TAX LAW. 1452 (1979).
4. For additional analyses of the Staff Report, see Ferguson & Stiver, Taxable
Corporate Acquisitions after TEFRA, 42 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX 12-1 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Ferguson & Stiver]; Liles, II, Subchapter C Simplification Recent
Proposals, TAX MGMT. MEM. (BNA) 83-25, 3 (1983); Milner, Boot Under the Senate
Finance Committee's Reorganization Proposal: A Step in the Wright Direction, but Too
Far, 62 TAXES 507 (1984).
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INTRODUCTION
The Formative Period of the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions
The first statutory definition for tax-free reorganizations was con-
tained in the Revenue Act of 1921,5 and included mergers and con-
solidations, as well as concepts similar to E and F reorganizations
(recapitalizations and mere changes in form) under current law.>
The Revenue Act of 1924 (the 1924 Act) added D reorganizations,
permitting nonrecognition on distributions of stock of controlled cor-
porations.7 Prior to 1924, tax-free corporate separations could be ef-
fected only by creating two new corporations." The statutory prede-
cessors to section 354 and section 356 were also added by the 1924
Act, except that the principal amount of securities distributed to a
shareholder in excess of the principal amount of securities surren-
dered did not constitute "other property," and hence did not give rise
to capital gain or dividend income to the distributee shareholder."
5. Pub. L. No. 98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921) [hereinafter cited as 1921 Act].
6. Section 202(c)(2) of the 1921 Act defined a tax-free reorganization as:
a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially
all the properties of another corporation), recapitalization, or mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization or a corporation, (however effected);
7. Pub. L. No. 176, 43 Stat. 253 (1924). The 1924 Act defined the current con-
cept of a D reorganization as: "a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or
both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transfered . . . ." Section
203(h)(1)(B), 1924 Act. "Control" of a corporation was defined in the 1924 Act to mean
ownership of 80% of the voting stock and 80% of all other classes of stock of such corpo-
ration. Section 203(i), 1924 Act.
8. 65 CONG. REc. 2429 (statement of Rep. Green).
9. Section 203(c) of the 1924 Act provides:
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder
in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such corpo-
ration or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the sur-
render by such shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no gain
to the distributee from the receipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized.
Section 203(d) of the 1924 Act provides:
(1) If an exchange would be within the provisions of paragraph (1) [providing
for nonrecognition in like-kind exchanges], (2) [providing for nonrecognition to
shareholders upon the exchange of stock of securities of a corporation a party to
reorganizational], or (4) [providing for nonrecognition to shareholders in corpo-
rate organizations] of subdivision (b) if it were not for the fact that the property
received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph
to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of
The reorganization amendments made by the 1924 Act were thought
to be a panacea for flaws in the existing structure of the tax-free
reorganization provisions.1" Its provisions were reenacted with minor
modifications by the Revenue Act of 1928 (the 1928 Act).11
Apparently, the changes made in the reorganization provisions
were not the corrective they were thought to be, and thus the Reve-
nue Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) again amended the rules governing
fundamental acquisitive transactions.' 2 Among other things, the
1934 Act limited the type of a merger or consolidation qualifying for
tax-free treatment to a statutory merger or consolidation, and added
B and C reorganization concepts to fill the gap for those states which
had not yet adopted statutes providing for mergers and consolida-
tions.' 3 Before the amendments to the 1934 Act were adopted, a
Ways and Means Subcommittee put forth a strong argument for
abolishing the reorganization provisions altogether. 14 Abolition was
perceived as a way "to close the door to one of the most prevalent
methods of tax avoidance," and "to greatly simplify the income tax
law by eliminating some of its most complicated provisions."' 5 The
subcommittee report charged that the three goals of the reorganiza-
such other property.
(2) If a distribution made in pursuance of a plan of reorganization is within the
provisions of paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a taxable
dividend, then there shall be taxed as a dividend to each distributee such an
amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (I) as is not in excess of his
ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accu-
mulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized
under paragraph (1) shall be taxed as a gain from the exchange of property,
10. In a discussion on the floor of the House, Rep. Green (Iowa), referring to the
distinction between liquidations and reorganizations, stated:
There is no mere frequent or common course of evasion at the present time than
the provisions of the present law with reference to reorganization of corpora-
tions. They are so extremely broad and so loose that you could drive a four-
horse team through them, and -any good corporation lawyer can provide a
method of reorganization by which, if a company has a large amount of cash on
hand, it could be distributed without any tax, whereby it could realize the profit
which it has in real property or other property of that kind, and, in short, evade
to a large measure not only the corporation tax, but in a great many instances
the personal income tax. The changes which we have proposed in this law will,
to a large extent at least, prevent these evasions which are now occurring.
65 CONG. REC. 2429 (statement of Rep. Green).
11. Pub. L. No. 562, 45 Stat. 791 (1928). Professor Andrews notes that the prin-
cipal outlines of the 1928 Act have persisted, although that Act does not contain the
precise language of the present statute. W. ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 772
(1969).
12. Pub. L. No. 216, 48 Stat. 680 (1934).
13. Section 112(g)(1), 1934 Act. Compare section 202(c)(2) of the 1921 Act,
supra note 6 (the transferee must acquire only a majority of the stock of the transferor)
with section 112(g)(1) of the 1934 Act (the transferee must acquire 80% of the voting
stock and 80% of all other classes of stock of the transferor). In addition, voting stock
was the sole permissible consideration under the 1934 Act.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1934).
15. Id. at 38.
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tion provisions, i.e., to prevent uncertainty, to limit interference with
normal business adjustments, and to prevent taxpayers from taking
colorable losses, had not been achieved. According to the subcom-
mittee, the reorganization provisions not only failed to prevent un-
certainty, but were criticized as very involved, difficult to under-
stand, and difficult to interpret in practice, resulting in a great deal
of additional uncertainty. The subcommittee noted that the second
goal of the tax-free reorganization provisions, the avoidance of inter-
ference with normal business readjustments, may have had some
merit during the period of very high tax rates in 1917 and 1918;
however, the subcommittee perceived the then present provisions as
having been utilized for purposes of an indefensible character. With
respect to the third objective of tax-free reorganizations, preventing
taxpayers from taking colorable losses, the subcommittee noted that
transactions easily can be arranged to avoid reorganization status so
that substantial losses will be recognized. 16
The Ways and Means Committee also had considered the com-
plete repeal of the reorganization provisions in 1934, with the expec-
tation that in the course of time, by means of court decisions and
perhaps new legislation, a more desirable method of treatment could
be achieved.17 The Treasury Department, however, perhaps recalling
the stock market crash and the resulting substantial built-in losses,
opposed the repeal of the reorganization provisions, citing the pros-
pect of an immediate loss of revenue. The committee ultimately
agreed, noting that reorganizations were then being consummated to
streamline complex capital structures. The resulting losses would,
absent the reorganization provisions, be immediately recognized.
18
The committee thus concluded that the wiser policy would be to
amend the existing provisions "drastically to stop the known cases of
tax avoidance."1 9 The Ways and Means Committee Report accom-
panying the amendments made by the 1934 Act expressed optimism:
"By these limitations the committee believes that it has removed the
danger that taxable sales can be cast into the form of a reorganiza-
tion, while at the same time, legitimate reorganizations, required in
16. Id. at 37-42.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934) where the
Finance Committee noted that the Treasury Department has "little or nothing to gain"
by abolishing the tax-free reorganization provisions due to the fact that many reorganiza-
tions then being consummated would result in large losses to stockholders and bondhold-
ers although they might retain substantially their former interests in the enterprise.
order to strengthen the financial condition of the corporation, will be
permitted." 0
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the thereto-
fore largely implicit premise of the existing tax scheme that corpora-
tions are not taxable on the distribution of appreciated property.'
Thus, the current system of corporate and shareholder taxation in
acquisitive transactions has been in place, virtually unaltered, since
the mid-1930's. Although certain precepts of corporate and share-
holder taxation have since been subject to intermittent statutory
modification, 22 Congress has failed to modify the fundamental struc-
ture since 1934.
Subsequent Developments
By 1948, the Ways and Means Committee had become acutely
aware of "the confused state of the law relating to the tax effects of
corporate reorganizations, and a need for a study of this field."' 23 But
it was not until 1953 that Congress and the Treasury undertook the
comprehensive revision of the federal income tax law. Although the
Ways and Means Committee, working in conjunction with the Trea-
sury staff, had the benefit of studies and suggestions from tax profes-
sionals, the results of extensive tax hearings on forthy topics, a pro-
posed federal income tax statute drafted by the ALI, and the results,
compiled by the Treasury Department, of interviews with nearly 200
taxpayer groups,24 the Committee held no public hearings on H.R.
8300, which enacted the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the 1954
20. Apparently referring to the newly enacted and highly restrictive B and C re-
organization definitions, one representative stated, "We have taken the heart out of the
liberal provision which permitted the reorganization of corporations for the purpose of
tax avoidance, and we will save millions of dollars of Treasury through its abolishment."
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
21. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935) (some-
times referred to herein as the "General Utilities doctrine"). The General Utilities deci-
sion held that a corporation did not realize taxable gain on the appreciation of property
distributed as an in-kind dividend where such distribution does not satisfy a debt owed to
shareholders. The General Utilities Court distinguished a line of holdings in which the
corporation's declaration of a cash dividend prior to the distribution gave rise to a debt
owned the shareholders.
22. For example, the Revenue Act of 1939 amended the reorganization defini-
tions so that in determining whether "solely" all or part of the acquiring corporation's
voting stock was used in an asset acquisition (a B reorganization), the acquiring corpora-
tion's assumption of the transferor's liabilities, or acquisition of property subject to a
liability, would be disregarded. The Revenue Act of 1943 again amended the reorganiza-
tion definition to specifically exclude reorganizations of corporations in certain receiver-
ship and bankruptcy proceedings, thus codifying Mascot Stove Co. v. United States, 120
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1941) and Templeton's Jewelers, Inc. v. United States, 126 F.2d 251
(6th Cir. 1942). See H.R. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
23. H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1948).
24. Darrell, Internal Revenue Code of 1954 - A Striking Example of the Legis-
lative Process in Action, 1955 U.C.L.A. TAX INST. ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954 1 [hereinafter cited as Darrell, Legislative Process in Action].
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Code) .25 The contents of the bill were not made known to the public
in general until its introduction in the House in March 1954.26 The
resulting House bill provided a completely rewritten statute, contain-
ing a multitude of unfamiliar concepts and evidencing in the views of
one commentator a "rigid, definitional, mathematical" approach to
drafting.27 Public reaction was quick, and it was soon made clear
that substantial redrafting would be undertaken by the Senate, par-
ticularly with respect to Subchapter C. Substantively, the House bill
had not adopted many of the ALI's suggestions with respect to Sub-
chapter C, and so altered other suggestions as to render the final
product very different. 28 Those individuals who were primarily re-
sponsible for the ALI draft statute were "wholeheartedly in accord
with the views expressed by the organized bar that enactment of
Subchapter C as in the House bill would do more harm than
good."' 29 Thus, the Senate Finance Committee largely discarded the
House bill, and began redrafting using the existing law as a founda-
tion. Because time available to the Committee was short, the Fi-
nance Committee had virtually no opportunity for major policy revi-
sions, and the technical revisions ultimately made were, by necessity,
without benefit of time for adequate thought and reflection.30 Unfor-
tunately, in the process, the few ALI provisions with respect to Sub-
chapter C which had been incorporated into the House bill without
amendment, were eliminated.3 '
As a result, the 1954 Code left the reorganization provisions of the
1934 Act largely unchanged. The principal changes made by the
1954 Code to the reorganization provisions were with respect to cor-
porate separations (D reorganizations). 2 The divisive reorganization
provisions, which had permitted a corporation to distribute to its
shareholders stock only of a newly-created subsidiary, was expanded
25. Darrell, Legislative Process in Action, supra note 24, at 8.
26. Id. at 10-I1.
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id. at 23.
30. In his article, Darrell stated that there was little Congressional controversy
over the technical portions of the bill, but that there were strong differences of opinion on
a policy level. However, due in part to the short time available for public consideration of
both the House bill and the Senate amendments, the possibility of controversy was con-
siderably reduced. See Darrell, Legislative Process in Action, supra note 24, at 15-16.
31. See generally American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Statute (Feb.
1954 Draft); see also Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisi-
tions and Distributions, 33 TAX LAW. 743, 744 (1980).
32. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621.
by the 1954 Code to allow distributions of stock of existing subsidi-
aries, as well as of subsidiaries holding only passive investments, and
permitted such distributions to be made on a non-pro rata basis. The
1954 Code also amended the C reorganization provision to permit
stock of an acquiring corporation's parent to be used as considera-
tion, thus overturning Groman v. Commissioner33 and Helvering v.
Bashford,34 but did not extend this principle to B reorganizations. In
addition, the 1954 Code allowed for 80% of the transferor's assets to
be acquired solely for voting stock and permitted other consideration
for the remaining assets in a C reorganization.35 These latter provi-
sions were salvaged from the original House bill and were retained
by the Senate without modification. 36
In other corporate tax areas, the 1954 Code codified and extended
General Utilities, with certain exceptions incorporated therein.37 The
1954 Code also reversed Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.3 8 by
enacting section 337, which exempts corporations from tax on sales
pursuant to a plan of liquidation, just as General Utilities implicitly
held that corporations recognized no gain with respect to distribu-
tions in kind. Other statutory changes addressed specific taxpayer
abuses such as the avoidance of dividend treatment through the use
of collapsible corporations, stock redemptions through related corpo-
rations, preferred stock bail-outs, and other problems of corporate
and shareholder taxation not principally relevant here.
In late 1958, the subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation sub-
mitted to the Ways and Means Committee a report and proposed
bill prepared by the Advisory Group on Subchapter C.39 A principal
33. 302 U.S. 82 (1937) (a parent of an acquiring corporation is not a party to a
reorganization, thus giving rise to taxable gain to the recipient thereof).
34. 302 U.S. 454 (1938) (the participation of a corporation in the consolidation
of three competitive corporations controlled by the parent does not render the parent a
party to the reorganization).
35. The Finance Committee perceived the restriction of existing law that only
stock of the acquiring corporation would be permitted to be exchanged for assets ac-
quired as introducing difficulties in completing transactions in which certain shareholders
of the transferor corporation wished to receive property instead of stock in the continuing
corporation. S. RFP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODI
CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4682.
36. Id.
37. Section 311(a) provided nonrecognition on the distribution of property by a
corporation with respect to its stock, and applied to dividend distributions as well as
redemptions. Treas. Reg. § 1.311-1(a) (1955). Statutory exceptions to section 311(a)
applied to gains on distributions of LIFO inventory, section 311(b), and on distributions
of property with a liability in excess of adjusted basis, section 311(c). The recapture
provisions also overrode the general nonrecognition rule, section 336(a), which provided
for nonrecognition on distributions in partial or complete liquidation.
38. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Compare Comm'r v. Court Holding Co. with U.S. v.
Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
39. Bill to Amend Certain Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with
respect to Corporate Distributions and Adjustments [hereinafter cited as 1958 Proposed
Bill].
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provision of the proposed bill called for an amendment to section
331, pursuant to which shareholders would recognize gain on the re-
demption of stock only to the extent that the basis in the assets of
the distributing corporation exceeded the shareholder's basis in stock
plus assumed corporate liabilities, the so-called "basis-over-basis"
provision.4 The Advisory Group saw this amendment as a solution
to two particular problems under existing law: the harshness of the
rule subjecting a stockholder to capital gains tax on appreciation in
corporate assets when there is no change in beneficial ownership of
such assets; and the undesirable results of the collapsible corporation
rules, which often were used as "an offensive weapon to convert into
ordinary income items which would clearly be capital gain if the
shareholders had not made use of a corporation."'4 1 The Advisory
Group noted that the internal revenue bill of 1954, as originally
passed by the House, had taken this "basis-over-basis" approach, al-
though it was not a part of the 1954 Code as enacted. The Advisory
Group concluded that the approach of the House bill in 1954 was
"fundamentally sound" and should be adopted (with changes to re-
move the principal objections to the House bill at that time).42 The
Advisory Group additionally proposed amendments to the collapsible
corporation rules43 and a uniform "continuity of interest" require-
ment for the various types of tax-free reorganizations.44 Although
the Advisory Group's proposed bill was subsequently introduced in
Congress by Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation Chairman
Wilbur D. Mills, 45 the bill was never enacted into law.
The B reorganization definition was finally amended in 196446 to
allow an acquiring subsidiary to use its parent's stock as considera-
tion for the voting stock of the target, and to permit the drop down
into a subsidiary of the stock of the acquired target. As a result,
both the B and C reorganization definitions permitted certain trian-
gular acquisitions, subject, of course, to the "solely for voting stock"
restrictions on both types of reorganizations.
40. 1958 Proposed Bill, supra note 39, at § 12.
41. See § 12 of Revised Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter C on Cor-
porate Distributions and Adjustments (1958).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally Greene, Proposed Definitional Changes in Reorganizations, 14
TAX L. REV. 155 (1959).
45. The 1958 Proposed Bill was introduced by Chairman Mills as the Corporate
Distributions and Adjustments Act of 1960, H.R. 13104, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 103
CONG. REC. 17,387 (1960).
46. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 77 Stat. 19 (1964), § 218.
Section 368(a)(2)(D) was added in 1968 to include forward trian-
gular mergers among tax-free reorganizations. 47 The legislative his-
tory suggests that such a triangular merger had not previously been
provided only because of legislative oversight. 48 The Internal Reve-
nue Service had previously ruled that such a forward triangular
merger would qualify as a reorganization only if it satisfied the defi-
nition of a C reorganization. 49 Three years later, the Senate and
House committees concluded that there was no reason why a merger
in one direction should be taxable while a merger in the other direc-
tion is tax-free. The Revenue Act of 1971 therefore included reverse
triangular mergers within the definition of a tax-free reorganiza-
tion.50 Congress however, imposed more stringent standards on the
reverse merger, most notably the restriction that at least 80% of the
consideration used be "solely voting stock."'" In so enacting section
368(a)(2)(E) the Congress effectively liberalized the availability of
reorganization treatment. Previously, the Internal Revenue Service
had approved such transactions only to the extent, when the transi-
tory subsidiary was ignored, that they met the stringent require-
ments applicable to a B reorganization.52
The 1968 and 1971 amendments are paradoxical at two levels.
First, read together, they suggest a Congress concerned more with
liberalizing the reorganization rule than with the fine lines of doc-
trine. That impression has to be tempered, if not rejected, with the
contrast of the intervening tax bill of those years, the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, 51 which included substantial provisions targeted against
the merger activity of the late 1960's. 54 Second, the provisions are
paradoxical when compared with each other. It is puzzling at the
47. Pub. L. No. 90-621, 82 Stat. 1310 (1968), § l(a).
48. H.R. REP. No. 1902, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4440.
49. Rev. Rul. 67-326, 1967-2 C.B. 143 (the merger of a target into the subsidiary
of a parent constitutes a "C" reorganization).
50. Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2077 (1971). See H.R. REP. No. 1778, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1971); S. REP. No. 1533, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6123, 6123-24.
51. For an in-depth analysis of the triangular reorganization provisions, including
the problems fostered by their inconsistencies, see Testa, The "A." '" "C" Matrix of
Triangular Reorganizations, 38 INST. ON FED. TAX'N (1980) and Ferguson & Ginsburg,
Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAx L. REV. 159 (1973).
52. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (a "B" reorganization resulted where a
transitory subsidiary of the acquiring corporation merged into the target).
53. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
54. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue regulations to distinguish debt and equity so as to avoid interest deduc-
tions on what was in substance an equity interest. The Senate Finance Committee felt
that the potential to substitute debt for equity in a merger was significant. See S. REP.
No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 137, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws
2027, 2169. The 1969 Act also eliminated interest deductions on certain convertible ac-
quisition indebtedness.
26
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outset that it took Congress only one year to codify the treatment of
the forward merger but four years to codify the treatment of the
reverse merger.
Substantively, it is difficult to explain the differences between the
requirements for nonrecognition under the two provisions. In the
case of a forward subsidiary merger, if substantially all of the
properties of the target corporation are exchanged for stock of the
parent, the transaction will qualify as a reorganization. In the case
of a reverse triangular merger, however, a transaction will qualify as
a reorganization only if control of the target corporation is acquired
for voting stock of the parent. Thus, two new requirements are im-
posed. First, stock must account for 80% of the consideration issued.
Second, the stock so employed must be voting stock. At first impres-
sion, it may appear that the differences can be explained by the use
of inconsistent models: the forward triangular merger was analogized
to the existing C reorganization while the reverse triangular merger
was analogized to the forward triangular merger. Support for this
view can be found in the legislative history.5 But the 1971 amend-
ment clearly went beyond the B reorganization model by permitting
the use of boot. The conclusion appears to be, as commentators im-
mediately suggested, 56 that the difference between the rules gov-
erning forward and reverse subsidiary mergers reflect more a failure
to analyze the questions fully than a considered policy distinction.
7
In 1978, section 357(c)(3) was enacted eliminating taxation on in-
corporation of cash method taxpayers.5 8 This amendment was en-
acted to remedy an existing ambiguity of present law resulting in
differing judicial interpretations of the term "liabilities." In general
cash basis taxpayers who incorporated a going business were taxed
on any built-in gain. 9
The Subchapter C amendments made by the Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act of 198260 were specifically targeted to abuses
in the area of taxable corporate acquisitions.6 TEFRA eliminated
55. Compare H. REP. No. 1902, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1968) and S. REP.
No. 1653, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NE.WS
4440, 4440-24 with note 50, supra.
56. See, e.g., Ferguson & Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAX L.
REV. 159 (1973).
57. Id. at 183.
58. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 365(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2854 (1978).
5). S. REP. No. 1263, 95TH CONG., 2D Sass. 183-84, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6946-48.
60. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) [hereinafter cited as TEFRA].
61. See Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAx L. REV. 177, 216-18
tax-free partial liquidations for all but certain historic individual
shareholders; substantially restricted the exclusions for recognition of
gain on redemptions of stock with appreciated property; and pro-
vided an election, under new section 338, pursuant to which a stock
acquisition is deemed an asset acquisition with the assets succeeding
to the stock's cost basis, thereby replacing the effective but nonex-
press electivity of section 334(b)(2). 62 One goal of section 338 was to
eliminate an apparent inconsistency of section 334(b)(2) which per-
mitted the continuation of an acquired corporation's tax attributes
for up to five years after a stock purchase while, at the same time,
treating the transaction as an asset purchase. 63 Perhaps even more
important than the perceived theoretical inconsistency was the prac-
tical tax avoidance that the passage of time between acquisition and
liquidation permitted.64 Finally, section 338 was also targeted at the
selectivity feature inherent in the purchase of two or more affiliated
corporations.6 5
TEFRA also added provisions restricting F reorganizations to
changes in identity, form, or place of incorporation of a single corpo-
ration,66 and extended the anti-bailout rules to holding companies.
6
7
The provisions of TEFRA relating to corporate acquisitions were
formulated in a little over three months. As pointed out by Professor
Ginsburg, there was limited opportunity for reasoned participation
from most of the tax bar (included in the formulation of the provi-
sions) or for any careful consideration of the ramifications of the
proposed change.' Not surprisingly, then, Subchapter C remains
"inordinately complex and confusing," discriminating in favor of the
(1983) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions]. Professor Ginsburg sug-
gests that the subchapter C amendments enacted by TEFRA were, in a major way,
"fathered by the Wall Street Journal." Id. at 216.
62. Section 334(b)(2) provided effective electivity by making available a carry-
over basis for the assets of an acquired corporation, and by providing a cost basis for
such assets if the acquired corporation were liquidated within a certain period of time.
63. Under section 334(b)(2), the liquidation could occur as late as three years
after a plan of liquidation was adopted by the acquired corporation, and the plan of
liquidation could be adopted up to two years after acquisition. During this five year span,
the acquired corporation's tax attributes would continue.
64. Taxable gain could be deferred for up to five years, although the taxpayer
could retroactively enjoy the advantages of basis step-up.
65. Section 334(b)(2) permitted the effective cost or carryover basis election to be
made independently for each corporation, thereby giving the taxpayer a virtually unlim-
ited ability to pick and choose which assets (invariably depreciable, amortizable, or de-
pletable) would receive an increased basis.
66. See generally Denbaum, F Reorganizations: The Amended Definition Under
TEFRA, 8 J. CORP. L. 725 (1983).
67. See, e.g., Faber, How the New Tax Law Changes the Rules Affecting the
Bail-Out of Corporate Earnings, 57 J. TAX'N 281 (1982); Silverman & Serling, An
Analysis of the TEFRA Changes Affecting Corporate Distributions and Acquisitions, 57
J. TAX'N 274 (1982).
68. Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, supra note 61, at 216-17.
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well-advised and against the not-so-well-advised. 69 The perceived
procedural and other flaws in TEFRA have been pointed out by
others, however, and will not be discussed here in detail.70 Generally,
those flaws are not, however, in the underlying policies: very few
quarreled with preventing the types of transaction that TEFRA was
intended to block.7 1
The recent revision of Subchapter S contrasts sharply with the
piecemeal approach heretofore adopted by Congress in amending
Subchapter C. The Subchapter S Revision Act substantially modi-
fied the elective integrated tax regime for certain incorporated small
businesses." The benefits of this comprehensive approach are evi-
denced by the fact that current Subchapter S rules fulfill the original
theoretical goals of the Subchapter S provisions more successfully
and simply than did the old Subchapter S structure. Even the sub-
chapter S revision proceeded, however, only on the basis of a tacit
and relatively narrow definition of simplification.7 3 Nowhere in the
published Subchapter S revision history, including the seminal 1979
and 1980 reports, 4 is there an express and articulate discussion of
what should be sought in a reformed Subchapter S. Rather, the ap-
peal made is only to intuitive and imprecise notions of closing loop-
holes and eliminating traps for the unwary.7 5 That lack of precision
(at a conceptual level) allowed a number of important theoretical
questions to escape a focused, public scrutiny.7
69. Id. at 177-78.
70. See, e.g., Ture, TEFRA: A Major Step Backward, 75 PROc. NAT'L TAX
ASS'N - TAX INST. AMERICA 82 (1982).
71. See Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, supra note 61, at 216-18.
72. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669
(1982). Congress' comprehensive analysis of Subchapter S resulted in the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine for S corporations in all but liquidating distributions; generally
eliminated the earnings and profits concept for S corporations; and made the ability to
elect out of the corporate level tax far more broadly available.
73. See Chang, Recommendations for Restructuring of Tax Rules Relating to
Subchapter S Corporations: A Comparative Summary, 34 TAX LAW. 403 (1981).
74. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX RULES ON SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS,
(Comm. Print 1980), reprinted at DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 85, at J-19 (April 30,
1980).
75. Id.
76. For example, the substitution of the pure flow-through rule for items of in-
come for the deemed distribution of taxable income of the S corporation (to the extent of
earnings and profits) had a profound impact on the effect of tax preferences on such
enterprises. Generally, that effect received no scrutiny.
The Professional Commentary
Against the background of legislative history of inaction and nar-
row solutions, the intellectual history of Subchapter C appears one of
promise and aspiration. As noted at the outset, the history is also one
of failed hopes, inaction, and possibly even irrelevance. 7 The organ-
ized tax bar,. the ABA Tax Section, and the ALI have repeatedly
pointed to peculiarly serious problems in corporate and shareholder
taxation, have undertaken extensive studies, and have proposed sev-
eral alternatives to the long-standing structure of Subchapter C.
The ALI studied extensively the field of corporate taxation first in
the late 1940's and again during the period 1956 to 1958.78 In 1958
and 1959, in addition to commissioning the advisory groups, the
Committee on Ways and Means commissioned a number of tax ex-
perts to prepare papers on the problems of broadening the tax base.
The resulting seminal paper by James Lewis focused on the
problems created by the General Utilities doctrine.79 According to
Lewis, the General Utilities doctrine, in conjunction with the availa-
bility of capital gain treatment to shareholders upon a sale or re-
demption of stock, was the root of much complexity in the current
tax structure. These two features of the tax system engendered the
use of the collapsible corporation. Congress in turn responded to this
abuse by enacting the collapsible corporation rule of section 341,80 a
rule Lewis characterized as "unreadable, erratic, and uncertain in its
impact." Lewis suggested that simplicity and equity, as well as a
broadened tax base, would be achieved if the General Utilities prin-
ciple were repealed in its entirety, and if individual shareholders did
not recognize gain upon corporate liquidations in kind and corre-
spondingly took a substituted basis in such distributed assets.81
In 1979, the ABA Tax Section proposed the revision of the col-
lapsible corporation rules.82 Two of the principal changes recom-
mended were to substitute objective standards for the intent stan-
dard of current law and to provide for ordinary income only to the
extent of the unrealized appreciation on the tainted assets. A 1981
77. See, e.g., Ferguson & Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAX L.
REV. 159 (1973); Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5
TAx L. REv. 437 (1950) (criticizing limited scope of the proposed collapsible corporation
rules).
78. See generally Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Sharehold-
ers: American Law Institute Tax Project-American Bar Association Committee Study
on Legislative Revision, 14 TAx L. REV. 1 (1958).
79. See Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and
Sales in Liquidation, in 3 TAx REVIsION COMPENDIUM 1647 (Comm. Print 1959) [here-
inafter cited as Lewis, Proposed New Treatment].
80. Id. at 1646.
81. Id. at 1646-47.
82. Tax Section Recommendation No. 1979-4, 32 TAx LAW. 1452 (1979).
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ABA Tax Section proposal called for simplification of the acquisitive
reorganization definitions, a self-styled "narrow project." n83 The 1981
proposal would have (i) provided a uniform definition of permissible
consideration in reorganizations (50% stock); (ii) included a remote
parent corporation as a party to the reorganization; (iii) permitted
preorganization shifts in ownership without loss of continuity of in-
terest and a safe harbor after the reorganization; (iv) required liqui-
dation of the transferor in a C reorganization; and (v) certain other
limited changes.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the 1981 proposal is that it
is self-consciously a "narrow" project. It is as if, faced with the his-
torical pattern of legislation on the corporate tax structure, the ABA
Tax Section decided to adopt in its legislative proposal a form simi-
lar to that of prior Treasury and Congress-generated amendments.
8 4
At the same time, the parallel is far more apparent than real. The
enacted amendments, by and large, were designed to eliminate
abuses or serious taxpayer problems in the structure of the corporate
and shareholder taxes.8 5 The 1981 proposal, by contrast, was very
much a lawyer's project; this dissimilarity helps to explain Congres-
sional inaction.86
More recently, the ABA Tax Section has recommended codifica-
tion of Wright v. United States and reversal of Shimberg v. United
States.87 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), by contrast, has suggested few legislative changes.8 8 In-
stead, the AICPA issued in 1979 a general statement of policy on
83. Tax Section Recommendation No. 1981-5, 34 TAx LAw. 1386 (1981).
84. E.g., the 1968 amendment of section 368(a)(2)(D), the 1971 amendment to
section 368(a)(2)(E), and the 1978 amendment to section 351.
85. Thus, for example, the amendments relating to distributions and liquidations
in 1982 were targeted against a series of types of perceived abuse.
86. In general, pure simplification projects, particularly in an area as complex as
Subchapter C, have simply not been allocated scarce legislative resources by the Con-
gress, in the absence of clear political or policy justification for such allocation.
87. Tax Section Recommendation No. 1983-8. Compare Wright v. United States,
482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) (a distribution does not have the "net effect" of a dividend
if there is a meaningful change in the relative economic interests or rights of the share-
holder after redemption) with Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978)
(use of the meaningful reduction test with respect to the distribution of boot in the
merger of a large corporation with a small one is inappropriate because there will always
be a marked decrease in control by the small corporation's shareholders. Thus, "mean-
ingful reduction" should be determined with respect to interests held and earnings and
profits before the merger).
88. But see Federal Tax Division of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Statement of Tax Policy: Taxation of the Formation & Combination of
Business Enterprises (1979).
corporate formations and combinations.8 9 That document has appar-
ently been entirely ignored in the legislative analysis of corporate
and shareholder taxation. Indeed, generally, despite the many hours
devoted by these groups to the study of Subchapter C and the prepa-
ration of proposals for reform, Congressional inaction has enjoyed a
nearly unbroken history.
The frustration of the organized bar with respect to the reform
and simplification of corporate and shareholder taxation reached a
new height in the summer of 1982. In May, 1982, a public hearing
on legislation relating to "tax-motivated corporate mergers and ac-
quisitions" was held before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures of the Ways and Means Committee.9" Much of that testi-
mony focused on criticism of any potential effort to move quickly
with respect to legislation on such a complex topic; some likely wit-
nesses even declined to testify.91 Similarly, testimony before the Fi-
nance Committee late in the summer of 1982 (after the Committee
had already tentatively approved legislation) was highly critical of
the legislative process. 92 That testimony from members of the organ-
ized tax bar and the ALI apparently convinced Chairman Dole that
a thorough analysis of the existing tax structure and an intensive
study of alternative approaches was desirable.93
89. Id. at 41.
90. Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on
Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
91. Thus, for example, the Tax Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York did not testify at the May hearing.
92. In a statement before the Finance Committee, ABA Tax Section Chairman
John S. Nolan said:
The Section of Taxation, the American Law Institute and other professional
organizations have devoted thousands of hours to improvement and simplifica-
tion of the tax law. We are prepared to increase our efforts to provide a better
corporate tax law. We cannot, however, achieve that goal in a few days or even
a few weeks, in the kind of time frame that this bill and its House counterparts
(H.R. 6295 and H.R. 6725) have imposed upon us. The issues involved are fun-
damental and are matters as to which the views and experience of the practicing
bar and the academic community are particularly needed. The solutions would
benefit greatly from careful, dynamic interaction between the Congressional tax
staffs, the Treasury Department, academics, and the practicing bar acting
through its institutions such as the Section of Taxation. Accordingly, I urge this
Committee to adopt the narrow solutions we propose to the known tax avoidance
problems that exist and to announce that within the next two years the Commit-
tee will undertake a fundamental re-examination of Subchapter C of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. If you do, I assure you that the practicing tax bar will re-
spond effectively and objectively in improving and simplifying our Federal tax
system.
Tax Treatment of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions and of Certain Distributions of
Appreciated Property, and Job Training Credit Proposal: Hearing Before the Commit-
tee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
Senate Hearing].
93. Id.
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A number of common threads appear to run through the organ-
ized bar's consideration of proposals to reform Subchapter C. First,
the proposals from the ABA Tax Section have been largely techni-
cal. They have been designed largely to avoid lawyer's problems,
problems which rise to the level of taxpayer problems only if tax
counsel fails or is not consulted. That, after all, is in keeping with
the express limits of the ABA Tax Section's role with respect to tax
legislation. Second, the proposals have, by and large, been pro-
taxpayer. 4
THE PROPOSALS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT
In an October 28, 1982, Finance Committee press release, Chair-
man Robert J. Dole announced that the Finance Committee staff
had been instructed to undertake a comprehensive study of Sub-
chapter C.9 5 Underlining the all-encompassing scope of the project,
Chairman Dole stated that it would be "premature to foreclose any
areas of inquiry."96 Pursuant to the instructions from Chairman
Dole, proposals by the ABA Tax Section 97 and the ALI" laid the
foundation for the project. In addition, the staff relied extensively on
studies prepared by other professional groups over the years, as well
as on comments solicited from the public.
By far the most important procedural innovation in the Sub-
chapter C project was the commissioning of an informal working
group of corporate tax experts from the private bar.99 That group,
comprised of about a dozen core members, met regularly from May
through September, 1983, first to consider the ALI proposals, and
then to react to tentative staff recommendations and to other
problems. By July, 1983, the staff had completed a summary of deci-
94. That characterization is controversial, of course, and no systematic argument
will be made here that it is a fair assessment. By way of example, however, the 1981
legislative recommendation, while imposing a minimum continuity of interest standard in
A reorganizations, is probably pro-taxpayer because of the substantial easing of the stan-
dards for a B reorganization, and the express elimination of pre-reorganization continuity
of interest as a requirement for reorganization status are clearly substantial pro-taxpayer
liberalizations. Such liberalizations may, of course, be entirely appropriate.
95. Press Release No. 171 (October 28, 1982), Senate Comm. on Finance.
96. Id.
97. ABA Tax Section, Legislative Recommendation No. 1981-5, 34 TAx LAW.
1386 (1981).
98. ALl Report, supra note 1.
99. That group was comprised of M. Bernard Aidinoff, Donald Alexander, Wil-
liam D. Andrews, Frank Battle, Jr., Herbert Camp, Peter Faber, Martin Ginsburg, Fred
T. Goldberg, Jr., Harold Handler, James Holden, Robert Jacobs, Howard Krane, and
Willard Taylor.
sions, and on September 22, 1983, a preliminiary report was submit-
ted to the Committee on Finance.100 The Finance Committee subse-
quently held hearings on the staff's conclusions and proposals on
October 24, 1983.101
The staff's proposals purport to "fundamentally revise the struc-
ture of corporate income taxation" and are intended to lay the foun-
dation for a comprehensive Congressional review of the structure of
income taxation of corporations and shareholders. 10 2 The proposals
continue the simplification efforts that led in 1980 to the installment
sales legislation, in 1982 to the Subchapter S legislation, and which
led later in 1984 to a number of provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1984.103 The proposals were intended to simplify present law by
eliminating the importance of the form of a transaction as compared
to its substance, and by repealing certain intentional tests. 104 This
simplification effort will additionally make the tax laws more uni-
form by taxing substantially like transactions alike, thereby eliminat-
ing seemingly unfair results. A derivative advantage of simplifcation
may be improved levels of compliance. In addition, the proposals are
claimed to eliminate incentives for abusive distributions and other
transactions, such as liquidation-reincorporations. 10 5
In preparing the proposals, the staff assumed the continuation of
much of the existing tax structure. The staff assumed the existence
of a corporate level tax, and, generally, no tax to shareholders on
corporate level income prior to its distribution. Thus, the staff made
no analysis of, nor judgment with respect to the propriety of, a cor-
porate level tax.10 The ALI Report, from which many of the staff's
acquisitions proposals were drawn, likewise assumed the continuation
of the two-level tax, and the ALI's acquisition proposals thus ruled
out integration as a solution to problems in the acquisitions area.0 7
Nevertheless, the ALI did make an effort to identify the relation-
ships between their acquisitions proposals and some of the integra-
tion proposals formulated elsewhere, and assessed their impact on
100. See supra note 1. The Staff Report is an unusual document in two principal
respects. First, the role of the staff as counsel is more apparent than is ordinarily the
case. Second, the Staff Report makes the arguments on the various issues open to the
public, to an extraordinary degree, enabling critics to engage directly the arguments
which the staff has identified as compelling.
101. See Reform of Corporate Taxation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Hearing].
102. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
103. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494-1210 (1984).
104. The proposals contemplate the complete repeal of the collapsible corporation
rules, as well as section 269.
105. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 4.
106. Id.
107. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 2.
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one another.'08 On the other hand, the ALI perceived its distribu-
tions proposals to be "intimately interrelated with the integration
question," with 'their relationships being "ambivalent and com-
plex."'10 9 For that reason, the ALI drafters did not seek Institute ap-
proval on the distribution proposals; instead, it was determined that
continued discussion on these proposals is necessary "free of the as-
sumption excluding general integration." 110 That difference demon-
strates to many a failing of the Staff Report because the staff forged
ahead in formulating the distribution proposals despite the apparent
need for further study and discussion of the integration question."'
Second, the staff assumed that capital gains would continue to be
taxed at preferential rates, and that stock redemptions would be
taxed at capital gain rates while dividends would be taxed at ordi-
nary income rates. The staff expressly did not undertake a study of
the appropriate capital gain rate nor did it make any assumption
with respect to the relationship between corporate and individual
capital gain rates. 12
The staff assumed that the tax-free restructuring of continuing
corporate investments was desirable so that investors would not be
"locked-up" to the form of their investment. Thus, corporations
would not be affected by a shareholder sale of stock, nor would
shareholders be affected by a corporate reorganization so long as the
shareholders only received stock as a result thereof. The staff also
determined that the tax law should neither encourage nor discourage
combinations, purchases, and divestitures of business enterprises." 3
In addition to the foregoing, the staff assumed that there should
be no change in the rule providing for a step-up basis at the death of
a decedent, and thus, that a shareholder's basis of stock would be
stepped up at the shareholder's death." 4 The staff also assumed the
continuation of the realization requirement. Although the realization
requirement arguably is of Constitutional dimensions, the ALI does
not consider its definition as immutable and most theorists probably
could deny the requirement constitutional status." 5 In fact, the ALI
108. Id. at 2-3.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id.
111. The distribution proposals are outlined in the Staff Report, supra note 1, at
76-79. See, e.g., Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 4.
112. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; cf. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 14-15.
113. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
114. Id.
115. See ALI Report, supra note 1, at 12. See, e.g., Survey, The Supreme Court
and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L.
considers the proposal repealing the General Utilities doctrine as a
change in the traditional concept of realization."" This assessment
may be quite accurate, given the fact that the General Utilities deci-
sion addressed the corporate level realization issue, not the recogni-
tion issue which was embodied in section 311(a). Finally, the staff
assumed that the revenue effects of proposed changes would be neu-
tral, and thus irrelevant."7
It is an interesting exercise to ask how the results of the staff's
analysis might have changed if the premises had been varied." 8 For
example, the assumption that there would be a separate, corporate
level tax could easily have been discarded. That change would have
permitted an exploration of partial and complete integration propos-
als. Similarly, if the staff had explored proposals to repeal the prefer-
ential capital gains tax, a number of problems would have had dif-
ferent possible solutions. For example, the collapsible corporation
rules would disappear in such a world."19 Nevertheless, if most in-
formed taxpayers and most tax professionals were polled, it is hard
to believe that they would easily contemplate a world in which any
of the express premises of the Staff Report did not hold.
The staff ultimately made little reference to the 1981 ABA Tax
Section Proposal, except with respect to the requirement of liquida-
tion in a C reorganization. 120 That apparent disregard may appear
puzzling in light of Senator Dole's express instructions to the staff to
review that proposal. It is likely that the failure to rely more heavily
upon the 1981 ABA Tax Section Proposal follows from the staff's
endorsement of the more sweeping proposal of the ALI. The ABA
Tax Section's narrow proposal would have refined a concept that
would no longer even exist in the new ALI world of corporate
acquisitions.
The Finance Committee staff ultimately followed the ALl Report
on all major elements of the acquisition and liquidation proposals
but one. With respect to the proposed shareholder credit the staff
made no recommendation. Under the ALI proposal, any shareholder
receiving a liquidating distribution would be allowed a tax credit for
his or her proportionate share of the corporation's liquidating capital
REV. 779 (1941).
116. Id.
117. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 ("The staff presents these changes not as
revenue raising options, but as potentially meritorious changes in their own right").
118. For a similar exercise varying fundamental premises of the corporate tax sys-
tem see Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977).
119. Such rules would disappear because the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain would no longer be valuable. That possibility is recognized by the recent
report by the Treasury Department on fundamental tax reform. See I DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 123
(1984).
120. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 28 n.4.
[VOL. 22: 17, 1985] Current Proposals
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
gain tax.12' Minor differences between the ALI proposals and the
Staff Report are in the treatment of selectivity,' 22 the disappearing
basis problem, 23 the limiting of non-acquisitive cost basis transac-
tions, 24 and the reversal of the reorganization boot computation rule
of Shimberg1
25
At many levels, the Staff Report is an unusual document. Proce-
durally, it is both unusually open in its presentation of the arguments
in favor and against the proposals and unusually express in its state-
ment of a staff recommendation on obviously controversial issues. It
is also unusual because it is, to such a great extent, the product of a
common effort by members of the Federal Tax policy bureaucracy
and of the private tax bar. Finally, the report is unusually derivative,
based as it is so heavily on the ALI Report. As the reaction to the
Staff Report is assessed, therefore, it is important to recognize just
how unusual it is.
THE ACQUISITION PROPOSALS
Although this paper addresses only the acquisition and disposition
proposals, it is important to note that those proposals formed only
one part of the staff's recommendation. Other areas on which the
staff made recommendations include special limitations on net oper-
ating losses,' 26 ordinary, nonliquidating distributions, 27 affiliated
corporations, 2 8 and entity classification.' 29 Others here will discuss
those proposals. It is probably safe to say, however, that the acquisi-
tions and dispositions proposals represent the most complete package
of the proposals, and the proposals which would work the greatest
structural change to existing law. Assessed on the spectrum ranging
from reform to simplification, the acquisitions proposals represent
the simplification; the distribution proposals generally represent the
reform.
121. See ALI Report, supra note I, at 134-41; see also the first draft of the ALI's
1977 federal income project, reprinted as an appendix to Beghe, supra note 31, at 775.
122. The ALI generally did not address the question of appropriate limitations in
any detail. See ALI Report, supra note 1, at 97-98.
123. The ALI provided a number of different options, and recommended no partic-
ular resolution. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 84-89.
124. The ALI Report imposed no limitation.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 185-93.
126. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 67.
127. Id. at 76.
128. Id. at 79.
129. Id. at 80.
Overview of Liquidations and Acquisitions Concepts
The Staff Report does not propose any change in the current con-
cept of "complete liquidation" contained in section 331. The staff
apparently felt (although the conclusion was never stated expressly)
that the definition of "complete liquidation" under existing law was
fundamentally sound, not particularly difficult to apply, and not sus-
ceptible to any particular abuse (except perhaps in the case of liqui-
dation-reincorporations). This latter problem would be remedied
through other provisions in the Staff Report, primarily the provisions
repealing the General Utilities doctrine and the earnings and profits
limitations on dividends. Thus, although neither the statute nor the
regulations under section 331 expressly define "complete liquida-
tion," the current functional concept will presumably continue. 130
The staff's proposals make several fundamental changes in the
current tax law relating to corporate acquisitions, organizations, and
liquidations. In acquisitions, the parties at the corporate level would
be able to choose whether the acquisition will be taxable or tax-free,
a cost or carryover basis in the acquired assets, respectively, to the
transferee. Under existing law, the corporate level parties in stock
acquisitions in effect have the ability to elect a cost or carryover ba-
sis in acquired assets under section 338 (as they did under its prede-
cessor, section 334(b)(2) and the rule of the Kimbell-Diamond
case)."' This same electivity is available under the current reorgani-
zation provisions by controlling the type of consideration paid for
stock or assets, so as to qualify (or fail to qualify) as a tax-free reor-
ganization. The proposals contemplate the repeal of the existing re-
organization provisions and, in lieu thereof, submit two types of
"qualified acquisitions" for which taxable or tax-free treatment, and
correspondingly, cost or carryover basis treatment, is at the option of
the taxpayer(s). "Qualified acquisitions" are comprised of two cate-
gories: "qualified stock acquisitions" and "qualified asset acquisi-
tions." Acquisitions which do not fall within one of the "qualified"
categories are not addressed in the Staff Report and would be taxed
130. Treas. Reg. section 1.332-2(c)(1955) provides:
Liquidation is completed when the liquidating corporation and the receiver or
trustees in liquidation are finally divested of all the property (both tangible and
intangible). A status of liquidation exists when the corporation ceases to be a
going concern and its activities are merely for the purpose of winding up its
affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any remaining balance to its share-
holders. A liquidation may be completed prior to the actual dissolution of the
liquidating corporation. However, legal dissolution of the corporation is not re-
quired. Nor will the mere retention of a nominal amount of assets for the sole
purpose of preserving the corporation's legal existence disqualify the transaction.
131. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), affd per
curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827. See SFC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 80.
38
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under current law. Thus, the restrictions of section 355 cannot be
avoided. Whether the transaction will be taxable or tax-free at the
corporate level will be independent of, and have no effect on, the tax
treatment at the shareholder level.
The Staff Report proposes the repeal of the General Utilities doc-
trine;132 thus, a corporate transferor will recognize gain on the distri-
bution of appreciated assets where the distributee-shareholder ac-
quires a cost basis in such assets. The Staff Report, however, limits
the ability of an acquiring corporation to achieve a cost basis in as-
sets acquired from a related person.
13 3
Another problem area under then current law addressed in the
Staff Report is the liquidation-reincorporation transaction.134 The
two principal tax avoidance purposes behind a liquidation-
reincorporation are the bail-out of earnings and profits at capital
gain rates and the step-up in basis of depreciable assets. Under pre-
1984 law, a liquidation-reincorporation may be recharacterized as a
D reorganization only if there is 80% common ownership of the liq-
uidated corporation and the transferee corporation. No attribution
rules applied in computing the 80% ownership test. By contrast, the
Internal Revenue Service will rule that a sale of assets in a complete
liquidation qualifies for nonrecognition under section 337 only if the
shareholders of the liquidating corporation do not own 20% of the
value of the stock of the purchasing corporation.'3 5 Alternatively, the
transaction may be recharacterized as an F reorganization, or may
be denied complete liquidation status.'3 6 Nevertheless, substantial
planning opportunities were still provided taxpayers prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1984 due to the narrow definition of a D reorganiza-
tion and the 1982 amendments which virtually eliminate the possi-
bility of recharacterization of a liquidation-reincorporation as an F
reorganization.'
132. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 76-77.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 165-66.
134. See generally, Nicholson, Liquidation - Reincorporation, TAX MGMT.
PORTFOLIO (BNA) No. 335, A-1 (1976).
135. Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 C.B. 719; Rev. Proc. 75-32, 1975-2 C.B. 555, 557.
136. See Davant v. Comm'r, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1018 (1967) (F reorganization); Telephone Answering Service Co. v. Comm'r, 63 T.D.
425 (1974), aftd, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976) (no liquidation within the meaning of
section 331); Reef Corp. v. Comm'r, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 1018 (1967).
137. The legislative history of the 1954 Code suggests that the planning potential
created by the restrictive definition of a D reorganization was not understood. The Con-
ference Committee, which rejected an express solution in the House bill, stated:
The House bill in section 357 contained a provision dealing with a device
The staff proposal requiring corporations to recognize gain on dis-
tributions in complete liquidation would eliminate the incentive for
liquidation-reincorporations. Likewise, the distribution proposal to
eliminate the earnings and profits limitation on dividend distribu-
tions would similarly adversely affect many liquidation-reincorpora-
tions.138 Finally, the staff proposals would increase the opportunity to
recharacterize liquidation-reincorporations as D reorganizations by
reducing the requisite common stock ownership in a D reorganiza-
tion from 80% to 50% and by imposing attribution rules. This latter
proposal was adopted in the Tax Reform Act of 1984139 and is effec-
tive for plans adopted after the date of enactment. As a result, cash
or other liquid assets distributed to shareholders in the transaction
will often be taxable as ordinary income.
A 1981 ABA Tax Section proposal would have required a trans-
feror in a C reorganization to liquidate.140 The merits of this propo-
sal are twofold: First, because earnings and profits follow the ac-
quired assets, it is possible to create a highly liquid shell from which
distributions may be made as returns of capital. Second, in all other
forms of nontaxable corporate acquisitions, the acquired corporation
cannot be retained as a shell. Thus, a similar requirement for C reor-
ganizations would provide symmetry. Arguably, such a requirement
would also provide simplicity. The 1984 Act has incorporated a pro-
vision which requires liquidation of a transferor corporation in a C
reorganization in order for the transaction to qualify as a C reorgan-
whereby it has been attempted to withdraw corporate earnings as capital gain
rates by distributing all the assets of a corporation in complete liquidation and
promptly reincorporating the business assets. This provision gave rise to certain
technical problems and it has not been retained in the bill as recommended by
the accompanying conference report. It is the belief of the managers on the part
of the House that, at the present time, the possibility of tax avoidance in this
area is not sufficiently serious to require a special statutory provision. It is be-
lieved that this possibility can appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision
or by regulation within the framework of other provisions of the bill.
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5280, 5301. See also Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, 3 TAX REVIsION
COMPENDIUM 1619 (Comm. Print 1959).
138. The Staff Report proposes three principal changes to the treatment of corpo-
rate distributions, each of which would severely limit the tax benefits of liquidation-
reincorporations under current law. The first is the repeal of General Utilities, which has
been discussed extensively elsewhere in this article and which has perhaps received the
greatest amount of public attention to date. The second change would result in the repeal
of the earnings and profits limitation on dividend distributions. The tax-free return of
capital would be permitted only to contributing shareholders within a limited period fol-
lowing the contribution. The third change would restrict the dividends received deduction
by extending the minimum holding period and by denying an interest deduction on debt
incurred to carry stock producing dividends eligible for the dividends received deduction.
See generally SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 76-79.
139. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Act].
140. Tax Section Recommendation No. 1981-5, 34 TAx LAW. 1386 (1981).
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ization.141 Two abuses arising in the absence of such a requirement
were cited by the Finance Committee.142 First, if the transferor re-
tains assets (rather than distributes them) and continues to engage
in an active trade or business, a transaction which qualifies as a C
reorganization takes on a divisive character, without meeting the
more stringent requirements of a D reorganization. In addition, be-
cause the transferor loses its tax attributes, it will be treated as a
new corporation with no earnings and profits so that distributions of
the retained assets will not be treated as dividends. Moreover, the
Finance Committee recognized that the C reorganization provisions
were designed to fill the void for those states not having merger stat-
utes, and thus were intended to roughly parallel state merger stat-
utes under which the transferor is liquidated by operation of law. 4
The 1984 Act imposes a harsh penalty for failure to liquidate in a C
reorganization: the entire transaction becomes taxable. Thus, the
1984 Act (like the 1981 ABA Tax Section Proposal), places extreme
importance on the form of the transaction with harsh results for un-
wary shareholders. It may be questioned whether the use that may
be made of a corporate transferor which does not liquidate warrants
such a strong response. Under the staffs proposal, failure to liqui-
date would result in tax only to the extent of the lesser of net gain
recognized, or boot received. It would not disqualify the entire trans-
action as a tax-free reorganization.1
4 4
Because under the staff proposals, unrealized gain will always be
taxed to the target corporation, the staff and the ALI concluded that
the complex collapsible corporation rules of section 341 would be
completely repealed. 45 It remains to be seen whether a two level
capital gains tax will be as an effective deterrent to forming collapsi-
ble corporations as is the one level ordinary income tax treatment
under current law. Critics may argue, simply, that a two tier capital
gains tax - with a maximum combined effective rate of approxi-
mately 42% - will present an attractive rate arbitrage potential if a
50% ordinary income tax can be avoided. To assess that challenge,
the purpose of the collapsible corporation provisions has to be re-
viewed.' 46 Historically, the impetus for the collapsible corporation
141. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 64(a).
142. Explanation of the Senate Finance Committee, Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of
1984 (April 2, 1984).
143. See supra notes 13-14, and accompanying text.
144. See infra text accompanying note 155.
145. See SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 16-17.
146. See Holden, The Collapsible Corporation: What, Why, How: Understanding
rules comes from efforts in the movie industry, for example, to con-
vert what would otherwise be earned income into capital gains.147 To
do this, a highly compensated film actor would create a corporation
to produce a film in which he would star; his compensation would
take the form of a low salary plus shares of stock in the corporation
which owned the movie.'4 8 On completion of production, the stock of
the corporation would be sold at a substantial capital gain, the cor-
poration liquidated, and the movie exhibited. The benefits from such
a tax structure are two. The most important, of course, is the conver-
sion of ordinary income into capital gain; a lesser deferral benefit
may also arise. The current collapsible corporation provisions ad-
dress foreclose these benefits by making the gain realized on sale of
the stock of the corporation ordinary income. 49 At first impression,
the critics would appear to be right: why should the maximum rate
of tax be reduced from 50% to 42%?
Classification of Acquisitions at the Corporate Level
Under the staff proposals, the tax treatment of acquisitions at the
corporate level is completely unrelated to, and has no effect on, the
tax treatment at the shareholder level. Acquisitions at the corporate
level will fall into one of three categories: "qualified stock acquisi-
tions," "qualified asset acquisitions," and all other acquisitions of
stock or assets which fail to meet one of the qualified acquisition
definitions. An acquisition which does not constitute a qualified stock
or asset acquisition will be subject to tax under otherwise applicable
rules.
A "qualified stock acquisition" is defined as an acquisition within
a twelve-month period from unrelated persons (determined under
The Creature as a Protection Against Unfortunate Tax Results, 34 INST. ON FED. TAX'N
11 (1976); Ginsburg, Collapsible Corporations - Revisiting an Old Misfortune, 33 TAX
L. REV. 307, 309 (1978):
In 1961 Judge Wisdom capsuled the origin of the collapsible provision and its essential
structural defect:
The collapsible corporation is a brain child of resourceful tax advisors to the
motion picture and the construction industries. By using corporate trappings
taxpayers, before 1950, were able to cloak a single venture or short-term project
with the appearance of a long-term investment; for example, a corporation
would be organized to produce a single picture, the director and actors would
receive stock instead of salaries, and the stock would be sold or the corporation
liquidated as soon as the picture was made. Congressional committee reports
described the collapsible corporation as "a device whereby one or more individu-
als attempted to convert the profits from their participation in a project from
income taxable at ordinary rates [20 percent to 91 percent for individuals and
from 30 percent to 52 percent for corporations] to a long-term capital gain taxa-
ble at only a rate of [then] 25 percent."
[footnotes omitted].
147. See, e.g., Pat O'Brien v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 376 (1955).
148. Id.
149. § 341(a).
[VOL. 22: 17, 1985] Current Proposals
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
section 318(a)) of 80% of the stock of a corporation.Y50 A "qualified
asset acquisition" results from a statutory merger or consolidation,
or from one or more transactions in which the acquiring corporation
acquires "substantially all" of the assets of the acquired corpora-
tion.15' The selection of assets for cost basis or carryover basis treat-
ment is generally not permitted within a single corporation, except
for a special rule whereby acquisition premium may retain a carry-
over basis in an otherwise cost basis acquisition.
Cost Basis Acquisitions
In a qualified stock acquisition in which a cost basis election has
been made, or in a qualified asset acquisition in which no election
has been made, the assets of the target will take a cost basis. Corre-
spondingly, the target will be treated as a new corporation and thus
will lose all of its predecessor's tax attributes.
In a cost basis stock acquisition, the transferee corporation will
recognize the gain, but the gain cannot be included in the acquiring
group's consolidated return. In a cost basis asset acquisition, the un-
realized appreciation will be recognized by the transferor corpora-
tion, and such gain can be included in the selling group's consoli-
dated return.
The proposals provide a mirror basis rule, whereby the basis in the
acquired corporation's stock will mirror its basis in the assets. There-
fore, not only will the basis in assets be adjusted to cost in a cost
basis stock acquisition, but the stock basis of a transferee which ac-
quires assets in a cost basis asset acquisition will also be adjusted.
Carryover Basis Acquisitions
In a qualified stock acquisition in which no election has been
made, or in a qualified asset acquisition in which carryover basis has
been elected, the assets of the target will take a carryover basis. The
carryover of the target's attributes will be governed by section 381.
Under the mirror basis rule, the stock basis of the transferee cor-
poration will be adjusted to reflect the carryover basis of the ac-
quired assets. By this proposal, coupling a carryover basis election
with a cash basis purchase yields the perhaps surprising result that
basis disappears if the carryover basis is lower than the amount of
150. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
151. Id. at 56. The proposals contemplate so-called Zenz transactions, permitting
the acquired corporation to redeem stock of a shareholder immediately before the acqui-
sition. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
cash paid. Correspondingly, of course, basis may be created if the
fair market value of the acquired assets is lower than their historic
basis.
It is important to recognize just how harsh the result proposed by
the staff is. The ALI Report retreated from that by identifying four
options which'could be adopted. 152 The tax law, after all, ordinarily
gives an all cash unrelated purchaser a basis in the purchased prop-
erty equal to the cash paid. The mirror basis proposal, in the case of
a carryover basis acquisition, would, by conforming the stock basis to
asset basis, reduce the basis below such cost. Although not fully ex-
pressed in the Staff Report, there are strong simplicity arguments
for the position taken. 15
3
A similar kind of rule, providing a carryover basis despite recogni-
tion of gain to the transferor, has been enacted in the 1984 Act with
respect to ordinary distributions within a consolidated group.154 The
absence of strong adverse reaction to that rule may suggest that the
unmodified mirror basis rule is not politically impossible.
Because the acquired assets retain a carryover basis, no gain is
recognized to the transferor corporation in a carryover basis acquisi-
tion. An exception to this general rule is if the target corporation
and any parent corporation fail to liquidate. The Staff Report rec-
ommended that the amount of gain recognized in the event the tar-
get fails to liquidate will be the lesser of: (a) net gain on the transfer
of assets, or (b) the amount of boot received.1 5 Gain will also be
recognized to the extent the principal amount of securities received
exceeds the principal amount of securities surrendered. 56 The pur-
pose of this gain recognition rule is to prevent avoidance of the
shareholder level tax, if any. If no boot is received, there is no share-
holder level tax; thus, there is no need to collect a corporate level
tax. In some instances it will remain advantageous not to liquidate
the transferor corporation, e.g., when the shareholder's basis in the
target's stock is substantially less than the target's basis in its assets,
or when the retained assets have substantial built-in gain.
The Staff Report follows the ALI in that, on a failure to liquidate,
the gain recognized by the corporation will be characterized as long
term capital gain.1 57 That rule, although simple, may provide some
152. ALl Report, supra note 1, at 86.
153. If adjustment is to be made to the basis of the corporate assets acquired for
the portion of the purchase price which represents built-in gain, then relatively complex
rules are required because that gain will generally be realized over time (and so increase
the basis of stock), requiring either tracing or very approximate phase-out rules. See ALI
Report, supra note 1, at 84-89.
154. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 54(e)(2).
155. SFC REPORT, supra note I, at 60.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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planning opportunities. For example, if the retained assets would
generate ordinary income on a distribution (e.g., as appreciated in-
ventory or because of recapture rules), maintaining the corporation
in existence will ordinarily be desirable. No loss will be recognized
on failure to liquidate. If losses were recognized, it would be possible
both to recognize a loss and to retain a high historic basis for depre-
ciation or other purposes in the hands of the acquiring corporation.
This would result in a double deduction for the same loss.
Electivity
The staff proposals conform to the ALI Report in that cost basis
treatment is presumed in a qualified asset acquisition, although the
transferor and transferee may make a joint election to have carry-
over basis treatment applied. Conversely, in a qualified stock acquisi-
tion, including a merger or consolidation, carryover basis treatment
is presumed, although the transferee may elect cost basis treatment.
The election must be made on or before the fifteenth day of the
ninth month following the acquisition.
158
In either a qualified stock or asset acquisition, cost or carryover
treatment is available regardless of the nature of the consideration
paid. Moreover, the present law requirements of continuity of inter-
est, continuity of business enterprise, and business purpose would not
be necessary to be eligible for carryover basis treatment. The only
constraint on the availability of elections is in the case of acquisitions
from related persons, in which case carryover basis treatment is
mandated. Cost basis cannot be elected if assets are acquired from a
related person. Additionally, stock acquisitions from related persons
do not constitute "qualified stock acquisitions," and therefore the as-
sets of the acquired corporation are not eligible for the cost basis
election. Because the proposals mandate carryover basis treatment in
acquisitions from related persons, the proposals differ from present
law under which there is no general limitation, 159 outside the ACRS
anti-churning rules, 60 to prevent taxpayers from achieving a cost ba-
sis in assets through sales to related persons. These proposals will
eliminate the means by which a transferor's expiring net operating
158. A revised draft of proposed statutory language implementing the acquisition
proposals of the Staff Report was subsequently widely circulated although never officially
released. See A Bill to Revise Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [here-
inafter cited as December 20th Draft]. Under the December 20th draft, there was a
single presumption that the transaction is tax-free.
159. But see Harris v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 405 (1968).
160. Prop. Reg. § 1.168-4(d) (1984).
losses can be given new life by sales of substantially all of its appre-
ciated assets to related transferees. Of course, such a rule will not
limit sales of a lesser part of such a corporation's assets.
Becaiise the characterization of the transaction is entirely elective,
the form of the transaction generally will be irrelevant for tax pur-
poses. However, the form of the transaction will be of extreme im-
portance where the taxpayer has failed to make an intended election,
because the form of the transaction (stock or asset acquisition) will
govern whether the carryover or cost basis presumption applies. To
the extent that most fundamental corporate transactions do not pro-
ceed without the benefit of tax counsel, the presumption ought not to
be important. The December 20th draft avoided the complexity of
distinguishing asset acquisitions and stock acquisitions precisely by
proposing a single presumption as to cost or carryover basis
treatment.'1
6
Repeal of General Utilities; Relief
Central to the acquisitions proposals contained in the Staff Report
is the repeal of the General Utilities concept. The proposals contem-
plate that gain will be recognized by a corporation on distributions
of appreciated assets where the transferee takes a cost basis in the
distributed assets, and that sections 311(a), 336 and 337 will be re-
pealed. The repeal of General Utilities is intended to simplify the
current tax structure, to provide for consistency on transfers of ap-
preciated assets, and to deter abusive distributions. Congress has
sought to achieve these goals over the years by carving out numerous
exceptions to the General Utilities doctrine as they were determined
to be needed. 6 2 Considerable complexity has resulted, and it can
fairly be said that under existing law, and probably at least since
1982, exceptions to the 1935 concept of General Utilities apply more
often than does the rule itself. The staff concluded that simplicity
161. December 20th Draft, supra note 158, at § 101(a) (proposed new I.R.C. §
392(a)). [See infra Appendix to article by Professor Thompson.]
162. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 enacted section 311 (d)(1), which
requires a distributing company to recognize gain (on the redemption distribution of ap-
preciated property) as if the property distributed had been sold at the time of the distri-
bution. This exception to General Utilities was in response to widespread redemptions by
large corporations with appreciated property. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
279, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2316-17. The depreciation
recapture rules of sections 245 and 1250, which override the nonrecognition rules of Gen-
eral Utilities and its statutory progeny, were added "in order to prevent tax avoidance,"
in part because of the increasing rates at which depreciation deductions were to be per-
mitted. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1962). Finally, for example, the
nonrecognition rule with respect to distributions of appreciated property was eliminated
with respect to distributions from an S corporation because of concerns that gain would
not otherwise be taxed at all because of the step up in basis on distribution. See S. REP.
No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982). See generally Oberst, Reform of the Sub-
chapter S Distribution Rules: Repudiation of Section 311(a), 38 TAX L. REv. 79 (1982).
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and consistency would be achieved, and abuse would be better pre-
vented, if the general rule provided for recognition of gain.
The Staff Report, like the ALI Report, generally fails to address
the question of when a cost basis should apply with respect to distri-
butions to corporate shareholders. 163 The proposals contemplate that
some form of relief from the repeal of General Utilities may be de-
sirable, and several options are suggested.' Transitional relief, in
the form of a phase-in of the capital tax on liquidation, may be
available if it is determined that the problem is merely transitional.
Under the ALI proposal, a shareholder receiving a liquidating distri-
bution is allowed a tax credit for his or her proportionate share of
the corporation's "liquidating capital gain tax."'6 5 The determina-
tion of the corporation's "liquidating capital gain tax" is the margi-
nal tax paid by the corporation on the sale of capital assets generally
owned for at least five years prior to sale, subject to various other
rules.' 6 The allowable credit is limited to the tax paid by the share-
holder on the sale of this stock.' 6 7 The ALI does not explicate the
concept of the tax paid by a shareholder. 68 The ALI shareholder
credit proposal lays the groundwork for the implementation of full
integration, should it be determined in the future that integration is
desirable.
163. See, e.g., SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 76. By contrast, the 1984 Act gener-
ally requires recognition of gain with respect to nonliquidating distributions regardless of
the distributee. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 54.
164. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
165. See generally ALI Report, supra note 1, at 134-41. The amount of the credit
cannot exceed the amount by which the shareholder's tax liability would be reduced if
the shareholder's gain on the liquidation were excluded in computing his income tax. Id.
at 135.
166. ALI Proposal C3 defines a "liquidating capital gains tax" as
the amount by which a corporation's tax liability (and that of any subsidiaries,
including any subsidiary disposed of or acquired on a cost basis as provided in
Proposal C4) for the year of liquidation and the next preceding taxable year
would be reduced by excluding all gains from disposition of capital assets and
section 1231 assets, except any such assets (other than goodwill and similar in-
tangibles) whose manufacture, construction, production or purchase was not
substantially completed at least five years prior to disposition. The amount ex-
cluded under the last sentence shall not exceed, however, the excess of all capi-
tal gains and section 1231 gains over capital losses and section 1231 losses for
that one of the following periods for which such excess is smallest:
(A) the taxable year of liquidation and the next preceding taxable year;
(B) the taxable year of liquidation and the next two preceding taxable years;
and
(C) the taxable year of liquidation and the next three preceding taxable years.
ALI Report, supra note I, at 135.
167. Id.
168. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 135.
A task force of the ABA Tax Section has recommended an ex-
emption from corporate level tax on the distribution of nonamortiz-
able intangibles, liquidating distributions of capital assets and sec-
tion 1231 assets held more than three years, and distributions of
controlled subsidiary stock. 16 9 A third form which relief from the
repeal of General Utilities may take is the provision of a carryover
basis election on liquidation. This may be characterized as a reverse
section 351 transaction and is analogous to the current rules of sec-
tion 333, albeit in a simplified form. Under this alternative, gain
would not be recognized by the distributee-shareholder until the dis-
tributed assets were disposed of.170 Another form of relief from the
repeal of General Utilities could be in the form of a corporate capi-
tal gains tax rate reduction at the corporate level, or on stock re-
demption at the shareholder level. Finally, it was thought that relief
could be in the form of excusing unallocated acquisition premium
from the repeal of General Utilities. Thus, a corporation would not
recognize gain on the distribution of those intangible assets for
which acquisition premium is paid.
The various relief proposals have disparate impacts. The carryover
basis alternative may result in long term gain deferral. On the other
hand, however, the carryover basis alternative could be administered
easily and would result in the eventual collection of tax on all appre-
ciation, without, some argue, penalizing the taxpayers for engaging
in business in corporate form. An ABA Tax Section Task Force sug-
gests that this approach, when coupled with the electivity of the
Staff's acquisitions proposals, could create differences between the
treatment of sales followed by liquidations and liquidations followed
by sales, and concludes that gain recognition at the corporate level
would be preferable.'
The complexity of the ALI proposal arises from the computation
of the corporation's liquidating capital gain tax and the calculation
of the shareholder limit. It has been pointed out, for example, that
the amount of a shareholder's credit could never be furnished to him
on an information statement from the distributing corporation be-
cause the credit limitation would be known only by the share-
holder.1 72 Moreover, as pointed out in the ALI Report, shareholder
conflict would arise in cases where some shareholders could use the
full credit, and thus urge cost basis transfers at the corporate level,
whereas other shareholders could not use the full shareholder credit
169. General Utilities Task Force Report, Income Taxation of Corporations Mak-
ing Distributions with Respect to Their Stock, 37 TAx LAW. 625 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Task Force Report].
170. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
171. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 634.
172. The credit may thus generate compliance problems, as well as complexity.
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and thus would prefer corporate level carryover basis transfers. 173 In
addition, the shareholder credit relief provisions would not benefit
estates, foreign investors and tax-exempt shareholders, and would
not easily benefit arbitrageurs.
Proponents of the ALI shareholder credit dispute the assertion
that it is complex. 74 The proponents of the ALI shareholder credit
note that the principal complexity arises at the corporate level in the
calculation of the corporate capital gains tax paid on qualified assets.
That calculation, of course, can be made by the corporation and for-
warded to the shareholders in an information statement. So, propo-
nents conclude, the complexity arises at a level at which it can be
easily managed; moreover, the complexity of the calculation of the
corporate capital gains tax is by no means significantly more com-
plex than many other existing corporate tax calculations. There is
additional complexity, however, in calculating the shareholder limi-
tation. Proponents apparently argue that it is a relatively easy mat-
ter for a shareholder to calculate the capital gains tax attributable to
a given sale or exchange of securities.
Moreover, proponents of the ALI credit argue, the credit best
serves the often stated policy of collecting only a single level of tax
on the built-in gain of corporate assets on liquidation. All other
forms of relief, including a partial exemption for certain long held
assets, can produce no tax in certain cases.'
7 5
Whether that is tru. will be determined in part by the rules calcu-
lating the gain attributable to the sale or exchange. How that gain is
calculated will be determined in part by the rule adopted for treating
capital loss carryovers and losses recognized in the same year. Those
issues present at once questions of fairness and complexity. At its
fairest and most complex, the credit would require elaborate carry-
over rules in order that a deferred capital gain on the sale or ex-
change of the security of the liquidating corporation is, when ulti-
mately taxed, offset by the permitted credit. In order to eliminate
some of the complexity in such potentially elaborate and complex
carryover rules, a simpler and arguably less fair rule would merely
allow the credit if in fact and to the extent that tax was paid the
year of the sale or exchange on the capital gain. Nevertheless, the
173. ALl Report, supra note 1, at 137.
174. 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101, at 126 (statement of William D.
Andrews).
175. The three principal examples are the foreign shareholder, the tax exempt
shareholder, and the estate shareholder. For a critical rejoinder to this argument see
1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101, at 165, 169-170.
ALI proponents maintain that there can be formulated a limited
carry-over rule which best satisfies the respective competing pres-
sures from fairness and simplicity.
Under the historic asset exemption proposed by the ABA Tax Sec-
tion, no tax would be collected in certain cases. In defense of its
proposal for relief from the repeal of General Utilities, the Tax Sec-
tion's Task Force contends that under their proposals, no tax avoid-
ance will result in tax exemption on the distribution of nonamortiz-
able intangibles so long as the distributee-shareholder retains a
carryover basis. The Task Force asserts that lack of such an exemp-
tion may give rise to valuation problems and that a statute without
such an exemption would be difficult to administer. 176 The exemption
for capital assets and section 1231 assets held for more than three
years reflects that the primary abuse to be prevented by the repeal of
General Utilities is the collapsible corporation. The Task Force lim-
its this exception to liquidating distributions because "liquidations
are often caused by economic circumstances beyond the parties' con-
trol.' 77 No examples are given or other evidence presented to estab-
lish this proposition. In so concluding, the Task Force apparently ig-
nores widespread tax-motivated liquidations, and perhaps would
more effectively achieve its goal by limiting this exemption to liqui-
dations resulting in the termination of the active conduct of the liq-
uidated trade or business in corporate form regardless of whether
such termination results in a partial or complete liquidation. The
Task Force proposes a final exemption for distributions of stock of a
controlled subsidiary because the assets of the controlled subsidiary's
assets would remain in corporate solution, and would ultimately be
subject to tax when taken out of corporate solution.178
Shareholder Treatment
Shareholder treatment is determined separately from the tax
treatment at the corporate level. 79 Moreover, the treatment of one
shareholder will not be affected by the treatment accorded the re-
maining shareholders. Thus, shareholder treatment is determined on
a shareholder-by-shareholder basis, and is governed solely by the
type of consideration received. Note, however, that the proposals re-
late to shareholder treatment only if the acquisition constitutes a
"qualified acquisition" at the corporate level. To this extent, then,
the taxation of the shareholder will be determined by the structure
of the transaction established by the corporate parties.
176. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 633.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 634.
179. Cf. Kass v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 218 (1973).
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Shareholders will not recognize gain on the receipt of "qualifying
consideration" in a qualified stock or asset acquisition. "Qualifying
consideration" consists of stock of the acquiring corporation, as well
as stock of the acquiring corporation's direct and indirect parents. x 0
Thus, remote shareholder continuity is permitted,' 8a as well as mixed
subsidiary/parent/grandparent stock. 182 For purposes of these rules,
if more than one corporation in the acquiring group has acquired
stock or assets of the target, the "acquiring corporation" is the high-
est corporation (having acquired target stock or assets) in the chain
of corporations, or, if affiliated corporations in more than one chain
have acquired the target's stock or assets, the lowest common par-
ent. 83 It is apparent that the rule in the Staff Report is incorrectly
stated. The December 20th draft states the rule that a party to the
acquisition (the stock of which is consideration qualifying for non-
recognition) means the target corporation, the acquiring corporation
and any corporation above the acquiring corporation in the chain of
includable corporations and owns, directly or indirectly, control in
the acquiring corporation.8
Shareholders will recognize income to the full extent of nonquali-
fying consideration (boot) received, and the current rules of gain rec-
ognition only to the extent of gain realization will be repealed. The
determination of whether boot received is "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" will be made by comparing a shareholder's interest imme-
diately after the reorganization with the shareholder's prereorganiza-
tion interest. 5 The Staff proposals therefore contemplate the repeal
of Shimberg and enactment of the ABA Tax Section recommenda-
tion. On this issue, the ALI proposals were silent, indicative of a lack
of consensus on the proposed treatment of distributions generally.8 6
Shareholders will recognize gain to the extent that the principal
amount of securities received exceeds the principal amount of securi-
180. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
181. Thus the final vestiges of Groman v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) and
Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938) would be repealed.
182. Compare section 368(a)(2)(D) (forward triangular merger) with section
368(a)(2)(E) (reverse triangular merger); cf. ABA Tax Section Legislative Recommen-
dation No. 1981-5 (mixed consideration not permitted).
183. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 62.
184. December 20th Draft, supra note 158, at § 101(a) (proposed rev. I.R.C. §
393(b)).
185. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
186. The Introduction to the ALI Report states that the drafters of the Project did
not seek Institute approval on the Distributions Proposals because their "ambivalent and
complex" relationship with the integration question made necessary further widespread
discussion. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 3.
ties surrendered.18 7
If, on the other hand, the boot (or a portion of the boot) is essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend, it will be taxed as such and, it fol-
lows, will have no effect on the shareholder's stock basis. The Staff
Report suggests that a distribution will be "essentially equivalent to
a dividend" if it does not meet the substantially disproportionate test
of section 302(b)(2) or the complete termination test of section
302(b)(3), 188 which determination, as previously indicated, will be
made after the reorganization. 18 9
This proposal has received mixed reviews from the commentators.
One commentator applauds the staff's adoption of the "after" test,
noting that the implicit rationale for tax-free treatment, continuity
of interest, relates to the shareholder's continuing interest in the en-
terprise under the modified corporate form, not in the pre-reorgani-
zation form. 90 However, he points to an apparent inequity of the
staff's mechanical dividend equivalence tests, which occurs when a
large corporation acquires a small corporation. He suggests that a
subjective test, such as section 302(b)(1), may alleviate this prob-
lem. '9 A second commentator has suggested that the alternative use
of a "before"and "after" reorganization test, depending on the cir-
cumstances, may be appropriate. 192 In what he has characterized as
"whale-minnow" reorganizations, use of the "before" test would be
appropriate inasmuch as shareholders of the minnow frequently re-
ceive boot in a last ditch effort to withdraw profits from their corpo-
ration before they get swallowed by the whale. He suggests that the
"after" test would be appropriate where the shareholders receiving
boot hold, in the aggregate, a substantial portion of the stock of both
187. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 64.
188. Two examples in the Staff Report which suggest this result are:
Example IV-22:
P corporation acquires T corporation through merger. Under the terms of the
merger agreement, the T shareholders receive 10 percent of the outstanding P
stock and cash equal to 33 percent of the value of the stock received. The trans-
action is treated as if the T shareholders received 12.875 percent of the P stock
and 2.875 percent was immediately redeemed for cash. Because that constitutes
a reduction of more than 20 percent, the T shareholders would be entitled to
capital gains treatment on the distribution.
Example IV-23:
A owns 10 percent of X corporation and 40 percent of Y corporation. X merges
into Y. Under the terms of the merger agreement A receives $100 of Y stock
and $20. After the merger, A owns 20 percent of Y. The value of the boot
would not have reduced the stock A received in the merger by 20 percent.
Therefore, the boot is taxed as a dividend.
189. See Milner, Boot under the Senate Finance Committee's Reorganization Pro-
posal: A Step in the Wright Direction, but Too Far, 62 TAxEs 507, 510-11 (1984).
190. Id. at 512.
191. Id. at 513.
192. Kyser, The Long & Winding Road: Characterization of Boot Under Section
356(a)(2), 39 TAX L. REv. 297, 323-32 (1984).
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corporations before the reorganization. 193
The shareholder takes a substituted basis in qualifying considera-
tion received. If boot is received (and thus gain recognized), the ba-
sis in the qualifying consideration received is increased by the
amount of the gain recognized and decreased by the amount of prop-
erty distributed. However, no basis adjustments are allowed if boot is
treated as a dividend. Under the staff's proposal, the distribution of




Under the proposals, liquidations of subsidiaries would still consti-
tute carryover basis transactions under section 332 unless a carry-
over basis transfer of substantially all of the subsidiary's assets has
preceded the liquidation.'95 The basis of stock of a controlled corpo-
ration would be determined by reference to the basis of such corpo-
ration in its assets. 96
In preparing the proposals, the staff recognized that under section
351, no gain is recognized by a transferor upon the transfer of prop-
erty to a corporation in exchange for stock or securities of the corpo-
ration if immediately after the exchange the transferor is in control
of the corporation. Under this rule, however, the potential exists for
taxpayers to structure acquisitive transactions to fall within the pa-
rameters of section 351, thereby avoiding the limitations and conse-
quences of the acquisitions proposals, such as the taxation of the
"excess" portion of securities surrendered. Thus, the staff proposals
would amend the nonrecognition rule of section 351 to parallel the
acquisitions rules. Therefore, to the extent the face amount of securi-
ties received exceeded the face amount of securities contributed to
the corporation in a section 351 transaction, the transferor will rec-
ognize gain. 97
The Staff Report suggests that the ability of an liquidating C cor-
poration to elect S corporation status ought perhaps to be limited
because such an election would avoid corporate level tax on liquida-
193. Kyser, supra note 192, at 326 & 331.
194. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938). That case held that a
corporation recognized gain on the disposition of assets, the proceeds from which were
distributed to creditors, in a reorganization.
195. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
196. Id. at 79.
197. Id. at 64.
tion. 9 8 In light of the widespread concern that the proposed repeal
of General Utilities is too harsh in liquidations, however, there ap-
pears little likelihood that a restriction on making an S election
would be adopted. The theoretical impetus for such a rule is clear,
however. If the appreciation occurred while the asset was held by the
corporation, then recognition of gain to the corporation and imposi-
tion of a two level tax is appropriate.1 99 This same question, of
course, bedeviled the Subchapter S revision process in 1982 in the
context of a one level tax.2 0 Ultimately, the S election was not anal-
ogized to a liquidation and the tax was not collected.20 '
THE PRINCIPAL POLICY DEBATES
The publication of the ALI Report in 1982 and the publication by
the staff of'the Senate Finance Committee in September, 1983, of its
preliminary report has precipitated a substantial debate over the pro-
posed revisions to the corporate acquisition and disposition rules.
202
What first follows is a brief summary of the principal theoretical
controversies. It is not a complete catalogue; there are any number
of technical and policy questions which have also received public at-




Proponents of express electivity, most notably the ALI, contend
that current law is effectively elective. The effective electivity claim
is made in at least two forms. First, in its strong form, it is argued
that nonrecognition treatment can always be obtained through a
suitably structured corporate acquisition. As a result, therefore, both
corporations and shareholders obtain nonrecognition of their respec-
tive gains and the assets and shares acquired take a carryover basis.
Second, in its weak form, the claim of effective electivity is simply
that by acquiring stock in a target corporation the taxpayer can al-
198. Id. at 81.
199. Critics would respond, of course, that the assumption that we have a two tier
tax significantly underestimates the numerous exceptions to that regime, not the least of
which is the General Utilities doctrine. See, e.g., 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101,
at 159 (statement of John S. Nolan).
200. See, e.g., Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-110 (1982).
201. But see Ginsburg, Subchapter S and Accumulated E & P: A Different View,
17 TAX NOTES 571 (1982).
202. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 169.
203. For example, the proper application of the presumptions as to cost or carry-
over treatment in the absence of an express election.
204. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 146-49.
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ways avoid recognition of gain at the corporate level and take a car-
ryover basis in the acquired corporate assets. The ALI Report makes
this weaker claim.205 At the shareholder level, however, gain would
be recognized except as provided by the installment sale rules or
other applicable nonrecognition rules. Taxpayers can achieve a car-
ryover basis in assets merely by purchasing stock; a cost basis in
assets can be achieved simply by an asset purchase. Section 338 (and
its predecessor, section 334(b)(2)) provides taxpayers substantial
flexibility in choosing whether acquired assets will retain a carryover
basis or take on a cost basis. Cost basis electivity is available by
planning into a failure of the reorganization provisions. By changing
effective electivity to express electivity, therefore, taxpayers will not
obtain any greater substantive benefits than what is available under
current law. So long as gain is fully taxed through the corporation
when the assets are taken out of corporate solution, there is no po-
tential for abuse.
Proponents of express electivity maintain that express electivity is
a more efficient means of achieving the same end available through
the existing effective electivity. 20 6 The complexity of effective electiv-
ity under current law places a premium on sophisticated tax plan-
ning, thereby discriminating against smaller businesses unable to af-
ford its cost, and imposing more substantial transaction costs on all.
Moreover, the results of effective electivity are rarely certain. Pre-
sent law contains many traps; both corporate level and shareholder
level parties to purportedly tax-free reorganizations may find them-
selves in taxable transactions due to circumstances entirely beyond
their control, such as a minute amount of unallowable boot received
by a shareholder or hidden liabilities assumed at the corporate level.
Express electivity is simpler in its application, and should reduce
transaction costs. Moreover, express electivity results in complete
certainty at both the corporate and shareholder level, thus eliminat-
ing the unintended hardships easily obtainable under current law.
Finally, proponents of express electivity contend that it is desirable
to repeal the continuity of interest doctrine, which theoretically dis-
tinguishes sales from reorganizations under current law. 07 Propo-
nents of express electivity contend that the distinction made by the
205. ALl Report, supra note 1, at 35.
206. Id. at 42.
207. See, e.g., Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and the American Law Institute
Study, 57 TAXES 840 (1979); Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business Enterprise: Is
It Time To Bury Some Sacred Cows?, 34 TAx LAW. 239 (1981).
continuity of interest doctrine is neither substantive nor logical,
thereby making it impossible to draw a distinction in other than an
arbitrary and capricious manner. For example, the continuity of in-
terest required in a B or a C reorganization is far more stringent
than the continuity of interest required in a consolidation or merger
(an A reorganization), although there is no apparent reason for this
distinction. To illustrate, the Internal Revenue Service will rule af-
firmatively that the required continuity of interest is present in a
statutory merger if shareholders own at least 50% of the acquired
corporation receiving stock in the merger.2 0 8 By contrast, in a B reor-
ganization, if a single shareholder receives even a single dollar of
consideration which is not voting stock, the acquisition will not qual-
ify as a reorganization. Because of the absence of apparent policy
justification for these rules, the strict requirements of the B reorgani-
zation have been repeatedly diluted both by the Internal Revenue
Service209 and the courts. 210 Most recently, judicial unhappiness with
the definition led to the requirement being temporarily read out of
the statute in Reeves21 1 and the accompanying cases.212 Moreover,
the various degrees of continuity of interest required under the dif-
ferent reorganization provisions generates undue complexity. That
complexity takes the form not only of the uncertainty arising out of
the judicial assaults on the statutory requirements but also the form
of assymmetrical results depending upon the direction of a subsidi-
ary merger.
That the continuity of interest doctrine does not substantively dis-
tinguish a sale from a reorganization is illustrated by an example
contained in the Staff Report, in which a 100% shareholder ex-
changes his stock solely for a .005% voting stock interest in the ac-
quiring corporation.21 3 The Staff Report suggests that there is no
real continuity of interest here because the interest of the exchang-
ing shareholder is qualitatively so different after the transaction, yet
current law holds that a tax-free reorganization has occurred.214
Contrasting this example is a situation in which a corporation ac-
quires a smaller corporation for a 90% stock interest in the new cor-
poration plus sufficient boot to destroy reorganization status. The
staff suggests that continuity of interest exists here, although the law
208. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
209. Rev. Rul. 66-365, 1966-2 C.B. 116.
210. Mills v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1954); Reeves v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.
727 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Chapman v. Comm'r, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980).
211. Reeves v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 727 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Chapman v. Comm'r,
618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980).
212. Heverly v. Comm'r, 80-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1I 9322 (3d Cir. 1980); Chapman
v. Comm'r, 618 F.2d 851 (1st Cir. 1980).
213. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
214. Id.
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holds that a reorganization has not occurred.215 Thus, the continuity
of interest doctrine as applied does not distinguish a reorganization
from a sale on a substantive basis.
Critics: The Concept of Reorganization
The critics offer four principal challenges to the arguments in
favor of express electivity. First, the critics argue that the reorgani-
zation concept is valid. According to the critics, the distinction be-
tween sales and reorganization is not impossible to delineate. Even
conceding that the line will be fine in certain cases, the distinction
between two corporations and their shareholders joining together to
pool their resources in the pursuit of a single enterprise, and the sale
by a corporation of its assets or by the corporation's shareholders of
their stock to an acquiring corporation, is both intuitive and real. It
is also recognized in financial accounting. 16 According to the critics,
continuity of interest is the key to the tax distinction.
Moreover, contend the critics, the basic reorganization definitions
have survived very well over the past fifty years. All that may be
needed is a fine tuning of reorganization definition to make it more
nearly internally consistent, much in the fashion of the ABA Tax
Section's narrow project. Thus, for example, if the continuity of in-
terest requirement were made uniform for each type of reorganiza-
tion, simplicity and certainty would be achieved without completely
rewriting the corporate tax rules.
The second argument advanced by critics is that the general reali-
zation principle of the Federal income tax law, pursuant to which
tax is generally collected when income is realized, should not be
eroded further in the context of corporate acquisitions. Support for
the proposition can be found, for example, in the limitations placed
by the 1984 Act on like kind exchanges, 17 deferral of recaptured
income on installment sales218 and on carryover basis in distributions
of appreciated property in a consolidated group. 19 That principle
also was at the heart of the 1981 assault on commodity straddle tax
abuses. Although the realization requirement may create a lock-in
effect (as has been frequently alleged with respect to capital gains
215. Id. at 86.
216. AICPA, APB Opinion No. 16, Business Combinations (1970).
217. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 77.
218. Id. at § 112.
219. Id. at 54.
taxation generally),220 no special policy consideration requires that
nonrecognition and tax-free treatment should be generally available
even for transactions which clearly fail to satisfy historical notions of
a corporate merger or combination.221
Third, the critics contend that electivity under present law, al-
though important, is far less than that available under the ALI Re-
port or the Staff Report. Current law by no means establishes that
general electivity of corporate nonrecognition should be permitted
for cash acquisitions. Nor under current law can a corporate level
cost basis transaction be coupled with shareholder level nonrecogni-
tion. Moreover, the increased ability to make carryover basis distri-
butions provides additional problems as to timing of recognition of
income and taxing income to the proper taxpayer.
The fourth argument forcuses upon what is to many one of the
weakest elements of the ALI Report, the explanation of why nonrec-
ognition should be permitted to the corporate shareholder because
the realization event occurs in a corporate acquisition (including a
creeping acquisition).222 The theory that is advanced by the ALI is
that nonrecognition on receipt of debt or other term securities (such
as sinking fund preferred stock) provides only a limited benefit.223
The shorter the term of the security, the less valuable the benefit of
deferral. But that theory goes too far. It would justify jettisoning the
principal amount limitation on receipt of debt securities, which the
ALI and the staff retain.224 It would also justify nonrecognition in
any exchange, on an apparently expanded installment sales ap-
proach. Critics of the value of consideration approach of the ALI
conclude that the inability to draw a persuasive line against the ex-
pansion of the ALI rule demonstrates its theoretical weakness. 2
220. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 192, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6761.
221. Under the ALI proposal, for example, an acquisition of stock of a target cor-
poration, the consideration for which was comprised 90% of cash and 10% of stock of the
acquiring corporation, would qualify for nonrecognition because the continuity of interest
requirement has been discarded. The only argument for the result made by the ALl
Report does not, its critics maintain, adequately address the criticism that the realization
requirement ought not to be further eroded.
222. Indeed, critics assert, the characterization of shareholder treatment based
upon characterization of the acquisition at the corporate level (as a qualifying acquisi-
tion) reestablishes a nexus between corporation level characterization and shareholder
level characterization that the ALI Report expressly repudiates.
223. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 157-58.
224. Id. at 178; SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 62-64.
225. Some have suggested that the explanation is more historical than intellectual.
If the requirement of a corporate acquisition were deleted and shareholders taxed based
upon whether they received cash or qualifying consideration, we would have moved effec-
tively to a consumption-based tax. Because the ALI income tax project was an income
tax project (and not a consumption tax project) that result was unacceptable. From this
perspective, the limitation of the result to the acquisition context is an ad hoc harmoniza-
tion of a consumption tax principle with an income tax system. I am indebted to Profes-
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The debate over express electivity has not received the public at-
tention of many of the debates described below. In essence, the crit-
ics of the proposals are alleging that the acquisition proposals are too
generous to taxpayers, but the spokesmen for that view have gener-
ally not made those arguments in the public arena to date. Neverthe-
less, the criticism is important theoretically and ultimately may have
to be addressed politically.
The Selectivity Debate
The Proposals
The staff proposals would permit election of cost or carryover
treatment for related acquisitions on an entity by entity basis. In the
acquisition by a single corporation of two related or commonly con-
trolled subsidiaries, one corporation could be acquired on a carryover
basis and the other corporation could be acquired on a cost basis.
Assets within a single corporation would be required to be treated
consistently; the only exception would be that acquisition premium
could be treated on a carryover basis in an otherwise cost basis ac-
quisition. Thus, the staff proposal substantially eliminates the stricter
consistency requirements under section 338. The entire issue is one
which received scant attention from the ALI.
Proponents
The proponents of the staff proposals argue that the stricter con-
sistency requirements of section 338 can be dispensed with once the
price for step-up is full corporate recognition of gain. This view ap-
parently originated with the Treasury Department in 1982.226 Ac-
cording to the proponents of the weaker standard, the existing con-
sistency requirements are of "questionable administrability.
''227
Recent testimony has suggested that the requirement may be work-
ing better than many anticipated, however. 228 The vestigal antiselec-
sor Wolfman for pointing out to me this perspective.
226. This "all or nothing" approach [I.R.C. § 338] is a
rational, logical and workable solution to the problem involved in selectivity.
This is not to say that other solutions may not also be viable. A complete repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine, which provides generally that corporations rec-
ognize no gain or loss on certain sales and distributions, is also an approach
worthy of consideration.
1982 Senate Hearing, supra note 92, at 85 (Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy, The Honorable David Glickman).
227. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 96.
228. See DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 67, at G-5 (April 6, 1984).
tivity requirement of consistency within a single corporation provided
by the proposal, the staff alleged, is necessary to prevent manipula-
tion of asset values.2 29 The staff never goes into any detail as to its
concern.23 0 The only other express argument made against asset by
asset selectivity is that it permits so-called banking of depreciation
deductions.23 1 That is, by appropriate choices of the assets to be
stepped up in basis, a taxpayer could tailor the recognition of recap-
ture income and increase in future depreciation deductions so as to
prevent the expiration of net operating loss carryforwards.
Critics
Certain critics argue that the selectivity aspect of the Staff Report
is too generous. In theory, the critics could argue that full gain rec-
ognition was an inadequate price for discarding the consistency re-
quirements of section 338. The consistency requirement, however,
from its existence has been considered a surrogate for a full repeal of
General Utilities.232 The 1984 Act may have focused attention on a
number of questions related to the repeal of the General Utilities
rule.2 3 Of principal interest are questions surrounding timing and
the identity of the taxpayer.
The more substantial criticism of the surviving consistency re-
quirement is rather that it is too strong and that the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine permits greater selectivity without abuse.
These critics contend that it is not clear to which situations an-
tiselectivity is targeted, and that in any event, taxpayers are able to
get around the antiselectivity requirement without great difficulty.
Three other principal options have been suggested by the critics.
First, asset by asset selectivity has been occasionally suggested.
234
Second, Professor Ginsburg and others have urged that in lieu of the
formal (wooden) corporation by corporation electivity rule, separate
elections ought to be permitted on a corporation by corporation basis
or on a trade or business basis, whichever is smaller.2 30 Thus, a tax-
payer conducting a single business through multiple corporations
could make inconsistent elections as could a taxpayer conducting
multiple businesses through a single corporation. These critics urge
that the staff proposal would inject needless complexity. Under the
229. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 96.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 97.
232. 1982 Senate Hearing, supra note 92, at 85.
233. For example, when should a corporate shareholder be entitled to take a carry-
over basis (thus deferring the tax and substituting a different taxpayer in the respect to
built-in gain)?
234. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
235. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Subchapter C Reform: Comments on July 6, 1983 Mem-
orandum of Preliminary Decisions (unpublished manuscript).
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staff proposal, taxpayers will be required to incorporate assets in
multiple subsidiaries in order to maximize flexibility with respect to
potential subsequent sales. Moreover, the ability to create multiple
corporations to avoid the consistency requirement would eliminate
any significant deterrent effect even if the stated goal were
desirable.
236
Finally, critics have urged that there is not, in fact, any theoretical
nexus between the consistency requirement and the General Utilities
rule.237 These critics have implicitly suggested that, indeed, the en-
actment of the consistency requirement in 1982 may have been a




The staff addressed, at least in passing, these arguments and
urged that the alleged simplication and reduction in formalism of a
modified trade or business test were substantially overstated.239
There appears to be no support for a complete substitution of a trade
or business consistency requirement. There is, however, strong sup-
port for a rule which permits selectivity within the smaller of a cor-
poration or a trade or business. Proponents of that option argue that
the trade or business requirement in section 355 has worked entirely
adequately. The obvious advantage of such a standard is that it will
prevent needless fragmentation of business organizations into multi-
ple separate business corporations.
The proper conclusion to this debate is particularly unclear. Per-
haps the ability to elect with respect to the lesser of the class of the
assets held by a corporation or used within a trade or business will
provide taxpayers the flexibility they need, avoid the creation of
needless formalism while preventing undesirable banking opportuni-
ties. If so, additional time to consider these issues will have been
valuable. What, then, of the argument that the consistency require-
ment of section 338 and the doctrine of General Utilities are unre-
lated? That question has, together with the more general debate over
the desirability of repealing General Utilities, dominated much of
the theoretical discussion of the Staff Report. As a practical matter,
General Utilities provides substantial tax benefits from the step up in
236. Id.
237. Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 4, at 12.06[a].
238. Id. at 12-66.
239. See Staff Report, supra note 1, at 97.
basis for some assets but provides no benefit for others for which the
tax cost of a step up in basis is greater than the tax savings that
result. What the consistency principle does is to reduce the incentive
to acquire corporations and step up the basis of their assets by re-
quiring that the tax costs associated with certain assets be netted
against the tax benefits associated with others. At a practical level,
accordingly, the two rules are very closely interrelated.
The Integration Debate
In the mid-1970's the possibility of integrating the corporate and
shareholder level taxes received substantial attention within the gov-
ernment, 40 the academy,2 41 and the private tax bar.242 None of the
resulting proposals apparently received a very positive political re-
ception. At the outset, the AL12 43 and the staff44 sought to avoid
entirely the bramblebush of the integration debate.
Critics
The third principal criticism of the Staff Report is that it consti-
tutes a retrograde development from the trend toward the elimina-
tion of the corporate income tax. Integration, in this view, is the
proper goal of corporate tax reform and any proposal which moves in
the opposite direction is wrong.245 The integration test is, in impor-
tant respects, a departure from the standard that has been applied
(at least expressly) by the organized bar in assessing corporate pro-
posals. The ABA Tax Section did not justify either its proposed
changes to the collapsible corporation rules or the acquisition reor-
ganization rules on the basis that they moved closer toward integra-
240. See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977).
241. See, e.g., C. MCCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwicE?
(1979).
242. See, e.g., Cox, The Corporate Income Tax and Integration: A Summary of
Positions and the Prospects for Change, 58 TAxES 10 (1980); New York State Bar Asso-
ciation Tax Section, Committee on Corporations, Integration of Corporate and Individ-
ual Income Taxes, 31 TAX LAW. 37 (1977).
243. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 2-3.
244. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
245. This objection was anticipated by Lewis in 1959:
Criticism: The double tax is inherently objectionable, and therefore, should not
be strengthened. Answer: The present system singles out for favored treatment
one kind of income (accrued gains on certain kinds of property) for relief
against the double tax, and then only in two types of transactions (distributions
in kind to shareholders and sales during liquidation). As to other types of in-
come, and as to realized gains in other circumstances, the double tax system
operates. Students of taxation are not in agreement as to the impact of the cor-
porate tax on shareholders, consumers, suppliers, or wage earners. Under any
theory as to the impact of the corporate tax, the reasons for relief restricted to
one kind of income in two situations have not been articulated.
Lewis, Proposed New Treatment, supra note 79, at 1647.
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tion. 241 Nor was the Subchapter S Revision Act endorsed because it
moved the taxation of corporate income closer to an integrated
system. 47
Proponents
The proponents of the proposal respond to the critics on several
levels. Defenders of the Staff Report deny that it is politically un-
realistic to assume the abolition of the corporate income tax even if
coupled with integration. Evidence cited for this proposition includes
the failure of the Carter administration to move forward with inte-
gration proposals,248 the adverse political reaction in 1983 when a
reduction in corporate income tax receipts was announced, 249 and the
legislative proposals over the last two years effectively to increase the
yield from the corporate income tax. 50 On the other hand, an argu-
ment may also be made that the political climate and role of the
corporate tax have changed significantly since the Carter administra-
tion first considered and then rejected integration.251
Defenders of the proposal also urge that critics have not identified
an inconsistency between the staff proposals and integration. Any
slight increase in corporate tax receipts which might arise under the
staff proposal is not an indication that the system is moving further
from integration. Indeed, the introduction of the shareholder credit
for capital gains tax paid by the acquired corporation in a taxable
acquisition is cited as precedent which could, if integration were sub-
sequently deemed desirable, be expanded. Finally, the argument that
the repeal of General Utilities constitutes an increase in the inci-
dence of corporate level tax vastly overstates the revenue significance
of the change.252 According to the revenue estimates prepared by the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the repeal of General Util-
ities, without any relief, would increase receipts from the corporate
income tax by only $0.7 billion in 1986, a year in which corporate
246. ABA Tax Section Recommendation No. 1981-5, 34 TAX LAW. 1386 (1981);
ABA Tax Section Recommendation No. 1979-4, 32 TAX LAW. 1452 (1979).
247. See H.R. REP. No. 826, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982); S. REP. No. 640,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3253, 3257-
58.
248. For a description of the Ford Administration's proposal, see DAILY TAX RE-
PORT (BNA) No. 2, at J-1 (Jan. 4, 1977).
249. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1984 4-3 (1983).
250. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at §§ 51-68; TEFRA, supra note 60, at §§ 208-28.
251. See, e.g., Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 4, at 12-69.
252. Id. at 12-72.
income tax receipts were then estimated to be $74 billion.25 3
The Simplification Debate
The Simplification Claims
The staff made five simplification claims with respect to the acqui-
sition proposals. First, the collapsible corporation provisions would be
repealed. Second, two of three intent standards, those contained in
the collapsible corporation provisions and section 269, would likewise
be repealed. Third, the principal consistency requirements, section
338(f) and (i), would be repealed. The full scope of the current con-
sistency requirements, of course, remains unknown because regula-
tions have not been promulgated.2 54 The uncertainty was heightened
by the substantial changes made to section 338, including the consis-
tency requirement, by the 1984 Act.2 5 Fourth, the proposals would
effectively repeal the nonstatutory liquidation-reincorporation doc-
trine. Although not express, the combination of changes proposed by
the Staff Report would largely, if not entirely, eliminate the need for
the type of judicial interventionism of Telephone Answering Service
Company. Finally, the staff proposals are claimed to eliminate whip-
saw. Thus, the spectre of a taxpayer-shareholder prevailing in court
with a tax characterization of a transaction inconsistent with the rul-
ing obtained for the transaction by the corporation will be
avoided.256
Critics of Simplification Claims
The simplification claims of the staff are disputed at a number of
levels. The critics argue that simplication is impossible. Critics assert
that recent efforts to simplify have failed, including the Installment
Sales Revision Act and the Subchapter S Revision Act. The most
articulate expression of the view is made by the minority report of
the General Utilities task force of the ABA Tax Section.251 Other
critics argue that simplification is unnecessary. These critics assert
that corporate tax law is not complex. Confronted with the appar-
ently complex rules such as section 341, many critics assert that the
collapsible corporation rules are de facto simple because there is lit-
tle voluntary compliance by taxpayers and less enforcement by the
253. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 108; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1984 4-3 (1983).
254. See Battle, Section 338--Stock Purchase Treated as Asset Purchases for
Tax Purposes, 60 TAXES 980, 990-92 (1982). Limited, largely procedural regulations
have been promulgated in temporary form. See Temp. Reg. § 5.338-1 to 338-3 (1982),
as amended by T.D. 7942 1984-15 I.R.B. 4.
255. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 712.
256. Cf. King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
257. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 638, 639-40 (Minority Report).
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Internal Revenue Service.258 Alternatively, critics urge that any
long-run simplification is outweighed by the short-run complexity
generated by a change in law. Finally, some critics claim that the so-
called reform elements of the acquisition proposals (principally the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine) are too high a price to pay
for the simplication achieved. They argue that the repeal of General
Utilities should be disassociated from the proposals to make tax-free
acquisition status expressly elective.259
According to the critics, whipsaw is not a serious problem. Despite
the frequency of citation of King Enterprises, there are few other
decided cases in which the problem has arisen. The relative absence
of cases is easily understandable, in part because of the asymmetri-
cal availability of the substance-over-form argument. Although the
Internal Revenue Service can often prevail upon the theory that a
transaction should be taxed according to its substance rather than its
form, taxpayers are more generally bound by the form in which a
transaction is cast. It is thus more difficult for a shareholder of a
corporation to repudiate the form of which a transaction is cast.
260
Where the problem has arisen, the Internal Revenue Service has
dealt with it satisfactorily by refusing to rule.2 l Thus, the issue
poses an interesting academic question but not a real problem.
Finally, critics question whether the clean sweep that the staff as-
serts may be made with respect to intentional standards and non-
statutory law will ever materialize. The objections to the repeal of
section 341 have been described above.262 Additionally, it may be
questioned whether the liquidation-reincorporation problem can be
solved as neatly as the staff alleges. Support for this latter claim can
be found in the legislative history of the 1984 Act.26 3 In the Confer-
ence Report, it was expressly confirmed that the Internal Revenue
Service may proceed against liquidation-reincorporations based upon
the existing judicial authorities notwithstanding the powerful new
statutory weapon created by the expansive amendment to the reor-
ganization definition. 64
258. This argument was made, for example, at the Mid-Year meeting of the Com-
mittee on Corporate-Stockholder Relations of the ABA Tax Section in February, 1984.
259. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 638, 639 (Minority Report).
260. See my forthcoming article on this topic in TAxEs.
261. E.g., with respect to nonrecognition under section 337 on sales to a related
corporation. See supra note 135.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
263. H. R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 847-48, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, vol. 6B (Aug. 1984), at 751.
264. Id.
Rebuttal
None of these criticisms is without a rejoinder, however. As to the
possibility of simplification, the first reply is that the alleged impossi-
bility of simplication is based on an historical error: the corporate
tax amendments of 1982 were not generally advertised as designed
to enhance simplicity, pace the minority report of the ABA Tax Sec-
tion General Utilities task force.265 But equally obviously the install-
ment sales and Subchapter S legislation were billed as simplifica-
tion.26 6 Were they successful? It is indeed a minority view that they
were not.267
As to the claim that the proper test for complexity is operational
complexity, adjusted for levels of compliance and Internal Revenue
Service enforcement, many would dismiss that claim with contempt.
Once we concede that we apply an income tax differently from the
law as written we have made an enormous admission against the vi-
tality and the legitimacy of our federal tax system. That is an admis-
sion that has never been supported and is, for many taxpayers and
practitioners, utterly unpalatable if not offensive.
One of the most interesting issues arises from the proposal to dis-
associate the proposal to repeal General Utilities from the proposal
to permit elective cost or carryover treatment of acquisitions. Propo-
nents argue that the two proposals are properly taken together on
both the political and theoretical levels. On the political plane, it is
almost certain that the Congress will not liberalize the treatment of
corporate acquisitions. Accordingly, the proposal for express electiv-
ity is dependent upon the adoption of the proposal to repeal General
Utilities.
At a theoretical level the relationship between the two proposals is
both more subtle and more complex. If General Utilities were not
repealed but express electivity (and its attendant shareholder recog-
nition rule) were adopted, then corporations could be sold in cost
basis transactions for stock, without imposition of tax at either the
corporate level (except for recapture and similar items) or the share-
holder level. That result is obviously substantially more favorable
than present law which requires shareholder recognition of gain as
the price for a corporate level step-up in basis. (That gain may be
265. See supra note 259.
266. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 826, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982) and S. REP.
No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3253, 3257-5B (relating to the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982); S. REP. No. 1000,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4696 (relating
to the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980).
267. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Future Payment Sales After the 1980 Revision Act, 39
INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch. 43 (1981); Chang, Recommendations for Restructuring Tax
Rules, supra note 73.
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deferred under the installment sales rule, however.) Is there a theo-
retical justification for that result? None is apparent.26 8 Such a rule
would provide an incentive for acquisitions because the tax benefits
of a stepped up basis for assets would often make a corporation more
valuable in the hands of an acquiring person than in the hands of its
current owners. That bias could result in inefficient allocations of re-
sources and undesirable economic concentration. Thus, the enact-
ment of the express electivity rules, in the form in which they were
proposed, without enactment of the repeal of General Utilities, ap-
pears undesirable.
On the other hand, if General Utilities were repealed without the
enactment of the express electivity rules for corporate acquisitions,
undesirable additional pressure would be put on the current reorgan-
ization definitions. In particular, because a section 338 election
would generally be less viable, it would probably become more im-
portant to secure reorganization status so as to defer shareholder tax.
In conclusion, therefore, the proposal to enact the elective acquisition
regime without also repealing General Utilities appears theoretically
misguided and politically naive.
Finally, as to the importance of whipsaw, it may be that the critics
are largely correct in dismissing whipsaw as a very serious problem
in the corporation acquisition context. On the other hand, the prob-
lem may be more serious than the critics assert, as the McDon-
ald's26 9 case demonstrates. But it also appears that we would be bet-
ter off if it were eliminated, and that is what the ALI Report and
Staff Report would do.
The General Utilities Debate
Undoubtedly, the single most important debate has been over the
proposed repeal of the General Utilities doctrine with the result that
all gain would be taxed to the corporation on distribution of appreci-
ated property. 70 The debate has apparently been limited to funda-
mental corporate transactions. No one has publicly challenged the
taxation of the corporation on gain recognized in nonliquidating dis-
tributions. Moreover, although not included as part of the 1984 Act,
268. But see Levin, The Case for a Stepped-Up Basis to the Transferee in Certain
Reorganizations, 17 TAx L. REV. 511 (1962) (step-up in basis appropriate when nonpar-
ticipating stock is employed in the acquisition because substantially analogous to
purchase for debt).
269. McDonald's of Zion v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
270. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 169; 1983 Senate Hearing, supra
note 101, at 19-23, 68-73, 89-91, 118-19, 150-70, 191-92.
there does not appear to be substantial objection to taxing gain on
FIFO inventory in liquidation." 1
Arguments for Repeal
A number of arguments support repeal of General Utilities. The
staff identifies nine in its report. 2  Only the most interesting and
important are discussed here. First, it would result in simplication of
the tax structure because it is consistent with other dispositions of
assets by corporations, and there appears to be no policy served by
continuation of General Utilities.2
Second, the staff has asserted that the General Utilities doctrine
permits taxpayers to obtain benefits which are better than if no cor-
porate tax were imposed. 4 Unfortunately, in one of the most serious
technical lapses of the Staff Report, that somewhat inflammatory
claim was never explained. What may have been in mind is the
271. Thus, for example, neither the ALI nor the ABA Tax Section Task Force on
General Utilities would provide relief from the corporate level tax on distributions of
appreciated inventory; nor would the dissent to the General Utilities Task Force Report
reject imposing such a tax on inventory.
272. The nine arguments enumerated by the staff are:
1. General Utilities permits taxpayers to pay less than they would pay in the
absence of a corporate tax;
2. Three arguments for simplicity;
3. Repeal will broaden the tax base;
4. Repeal will block certain tax-motivated acquisitions;
5. General Utilities eliminates all tax in certain cases, not merely a two tier tax;
6. Repeal will limit churning of assets;
7. Repeal will limit liquidation-reincorporations. Staff Report, supra note 1, at
88-91. Some critics have dismissed as "largely makeweight." Ferguson & Sti-
ver, supra note 4, at 12-72.
273. The Staff report asked:
The key question, in the staff's judgment, is why corporate liquidation is an
event which warrants special relief. After all, a combined corporate/shareholder
tax of up to 73 percent is collected on the ordinary income of going concerns. If
the nonrealization argument of General Utilities is rejected, why should special
relief be provided on liquidation or other transfers of substantially all of a corpo-
ration's assets?
SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 92. Again, Lewis anticipated this criticism and offered an
even more cogent reply:
The provisions [of current law] hardly pay lip service to the "double tax" sys-
tem. Congress has sawed off the tailgate of the corporate tax wagon. In so do-
ing, it has weighted the tax system in favor of business liquidators and traders
and against continuing owners. The latter are exposed to the double tax; the
former (provided they escape that erratic policeman, the "collapsible corpora-
tion" provision) are not.
Lewis, Proposed New Treatment, supra note 79, at 1644-45.
The most thoughtful critics of the proposals addressed these arguments, urging that
the two-level tax on operating profits is also illusory because, at least in the case of
closely held businesses, the two tiers of taxes can be avoided through leverage in the
corporate capital structure, payment of compensation or otherwise. See, e.g., 1983 Senate
Hearing, supra note 101, at 168.
274. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 88.
275. Id.
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tax-free step-up in basis of assets not subject to full recapture or
which have appreciated in value over original cost. For such assets,
restoring basis by liquidating the corporate holder provides the pros-
pect of a net double deduction of cost. So long as other income is
available to be sheltered, this is a substantial benefit."'
Among the other important arguments advanced by the staff are
that General Utilities has produced needless complexity in our law
and that it has spurred liquidation-reincorporations and similar
transactions between corporations and shareholders."
Arguments Against Repeal
Those opposed to the repeal of General Utilities assert that the
repeal will not result in simplification. Second, critics either deny the
argument that repeal of General Utilities would render the corporate
level tax more consistent, or dismiss the argument as academic.
Thus, for example, two of the most eloquent critics of the staff's pro-
posal to repeal the General Utilities rule suggest both that the al-
leged simplification and the benefit from uniformity are over-
stated . 78 They properly point to the enormous number of ways that
a small business, at least, avoids the two-tier corporate level tax.
Third, the critics are reluctant to discard go of a concept which here-
tofore has been firmly imbedded in regime of corporate taxation.
Fourth, the critics contend that General Utilities results in effective
integration, thus limiting the corporate level tax.1 9 The argument
made in favor of General Utilities by even the most eloquent critics
may be characterized as implicit at best.2 80 After describing the re-
spects in which the general rule of a two tier tax on corporate earn-
ings, two critics conclude: "[T]he Staff seems to build on sand in
basing their assumption on a need to preserve and extend a dual
level of taxation."28' If there be an argument here, it would appear
to be that because the two tier tax is subject to some exceptions, an
effort to eliminate any exceptions cannot be made on the basis of
uniformity and simplicity. When stated so boldly it becomes obvious
why critics have generally left it unstated. The critics point to transi-
276. Although a shareholder capital gains tax may be imposed on the appreciation,
the cost imposed by that tax will be far outweighed by the benefits from the increased
depreciation deduction.
277. SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 88-91.
278. Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 4, at 12-69, 12-70 to 12-72.
279. Id. at 12-67 to 12-69.
280. Id.
281. Id.
tional problems which will result if General Utilities is repealed, and
contend that shareholder relief provisions will be complex. Critics of
the repeal claim that General Utilities is analogous to a step-up in
basis at the death of a decedent.282 Finally, critics argue that repeal
would harm small business.283 This criticism appears to have been
given some weight in the ABA Tax Section's consideration of these
questions.28 4
Relief from Repeal of General Utilities
The form of relief from the repeal of the General Utilities rule has
also generated some of the most intense debate. The ABA Tax Sec-
tion task force has recommended an exemption from tax for long
held assets which generate capital gain. 2D The ALI, of course, rec-
ommended the shareholder credit.288 Most of the arguments sur-
rounding the respective merits of the various proposals have been
outlined above.28 7
Methodological Debate
The Staff Report's Premises
The scope of the Staff Report was premised on the assumption
that a comprehensive reexamination of the corporate income tax was
appropriate within the context of the premise of a corporate level
282. But see SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 92. The Staff Report noted in respect
to this argument:
The staff examined this argument in some depth and found it unpersuasive.
First, liquidation of a corporation is often a highly formal step without economic
substance. After a liquidation, in general, shareholders have substantially the
same economic interest as before. That is why liquidation-reincorporation trans-
actions have caused so many problems. Second, liquidations are often tax driven
transactions; individuals even with the best tax advice do not plan themselves
into death. The analogy between individual step-up in basis at death and the
General Utilities doctrine is both historically and theoretically misguided.
283. This criticism, too, was anticipated and answered:
Criticism: The provisions under discussion are utilized mostly by small business,
which the tax laws should be designed to encourage. Most small corporations do
not pay dividends and thus are not subject to the double tax prior to their liqui-
dation; therefore, it is logical to relieve them from double tax at liquidation.
Answer: These provisions have frequently been utilized by large and publicly
held corporations to escape the corporate tax on sales of assets during liquida-
tion. As regards small corporations, not all of them are able to avoid paying
dividends. Those which do not pay dividends are postponing rather than elimi-
nating the shareholder tax. Postponement of the shareholder tax during the cor-
poration's life does not justify elimination of the corporate tax at its death. If
the tax laws are to foster small business, they should foster its formation and
growth, not its liquidation and sale.
Lewis, Proposed New Treatment, supra note 79, at 1644-45.
284. See 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 79, at 1647 (footnotes omitted).
285. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 631.
286. ALI Report, supra note 1, at 134-41.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 164-78.
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tax. By its failure to discuss the economic consequences of the acqui-
sition and liquidation proposals, the Staff Report appears implicitly
to assume them to be limited. Support for this view can be found, of
course, in the limited overall revenue impact of the proposals. 2ss
Methodologically, the Staff Report was premised on a great deal of
cooperation with private experts. The process which yielded the Staff
Report proceeded on the basis of far more consultation with and in-
put from the private tax community than any other major legislative
proposal in recent years.2 9
Criticism
Three classes of critics have emerged. Critics of the staff's meth-
odology argue that prior narrow reviews have been adequate to deal
with the real abuses. 290 Further, the staff's project is too narrow be-
cause it has failed to evaluate various integration options.2 91 In the
same vein, critics also consider the failure to consider economic con-
sequences a fundamental flaw.292 Second, the critics argue that to
date, the evidence suggests that the lesson from the comparison of
the 1982 approach to corporate tax reform and the 1983 approach is
that only the former is successful. To these critics it is better to ex-
clude the bar than to include it with the real possibility that its
members will be better able to galvanize resistance. 93 Third, the
process which yielded the Staff Report has been criticized as being
too rushed, and too little accessible to taxpayers and their
representatives. 94
288. See SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 108.
289. By Congressional standards, the revision of the Subchapter S and installment
sales rules were not substantial items.
290. Further, despite the impressions suggested by the
report, these [current] anti-abuse provisions are effective in practice. In my
thirty-plus years as a corporate tax lawyer, I have not seen any widespread cir-
cumvention of the collapsible corporation rules or these other provisions. When
some special forms of abuse have developed, as they did in recent years, the
Congressional response was swift and effective, as in TEFRA. We have devel-
oped a new legislative capacity to deal with these problems as they arise.
1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101, at 161 (statement of John S. Nolan).
291. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 638 (Minority Report).
292. 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101, at 188-90 (statement of Thomas P.
Maletta on behalf of Tax Executives Institute, Inc.).
293. Although rarely expressed, concern with the risk of premature disclosure of
tax legislative proposals has shaped the legislative strategy for tax bills over the past
several years.
294. See supra note 290.
Response
The methodological criticisms of the Staff Report have met with a
mixed response. As to the various claims that the Subchapter C pro-
ject was either too broad or too narrow, there are available two sim-
ple responses, first, that the private tax bar demonstrated a remarka-
ble consensus in 1982 that global reform was desirable. 295 Second,
while any project must leave some tasks undone, it is hard to fault
the project as insufficiently ambitious, particularly to the extent that
such criticism comes from those players who have advocated the
ABA Tax Section's 368 definitional changes. Although it is certainly
true that there is very little economic analysis expressed in the Staff
Report, it is also true that, the taxation of corporate acquisitions has
excited relatively little interest among economists.2 96
The methodological criticism made by representatives of the ABA
Tax Section and others that the process giving rise to the staff report
was closed or, even worse, uncollegial, has probably provoked the
strongest, albeit largely private, reaction from the government tax
lawyers. To them, the criticism is both patently false and unfair. On
this judgment they are surely correct. The history of the project is
one of open and frank discussion, and the centerpiece of the propos-
als, the ALI Report, evolved over nearly a decade with close liaison
with the ABA Tax Section and others.297 Moreover, the Subchapter
C project began with a request for public comments.2 98 From that
vantage only the ignorant and the oblivious could be caught by sur-
prise. Because the criticism seemed so unfair and misguided, it is not
entirely surprising that it has provoked recriminations. How serious
or how permanent that damage remains yet to be seen. Surely Ed-
ward Hawkins is correct when he concludes that the pressure to
reestablish closer working relations is greater than the frustration
and mistrust.299
The Liquidation Debate
The General Utilities doctrine would be repealed in ordinary liqui-
dations of corporations by historic shareholders, as well as acquisi-
295. Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Ways & Means Com-
mittee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 108-09 (1982) (statement of John S. Nolan).
296. By contrast, the taxation of ordinary distributions has received substantial
attention. See, e.g., Bradford. The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corpo-
rate Distributions, 15 J. PuB. ECON. 1 (1981).
297. Not only were there several reports to the ABA Tax Section membership
during the project, but a liaison committee was appointed as well. See ALI Report,
supra note 1, at ix-x.
298. Senate Comm. on Finance Press Release No. 171 (Oct. 28, 1982).
299. Hawkins, The Government vs. The Private Tax Bar, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6,
1984, at 32.
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tive liquidations. Repeal of General Utilities is by far the most con-
troversial of the acquisition proposals although a carryover basis
election could provide targeted relief.
By far the most interesting questions presented is the relative tax
burden to be imposed on liquidations within or without the acquisi-
tion context. For the ALI, the burden on acquisitive liquidations
should be lower. That result was made available by the carryover
basis election which is to be permitted only in an acquisition.300 The
shareholder credit, of course, is available in both acquisitive and
nonacquisitive liquidations. 30 1
Many critics urge that the nonacquisitive liquidation is perhaps
even more entitled to relief than the acquisitive liquidation.302 That,
after all, is the source of the carryover basis proposal for relief from
repeal of General Utilities in the nonacquisitive case.303 Proponents
of the ALI rule urge that nonacquisitive liquidations are generally
tax motivated, and that further relief is not appropriate.
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE: THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984
In the preceding discussion of the principal theoretical issues
raised by the Staff Report, mention ahs been made in passing to the
enactment in the Tax Reform Act of 1984 of a number of provisions
recommended or generated by the Staff Report. In general, the Staff
Report received a more favorable legislative response with respect to
its distribution proposals. Why that was so may shed some light on
the tax legislative process, and the future of fundamental corporate
tax reform. To make those judgments, however, we must begin by
canvassing the recent changes.
1984 Changes Affecting Fundamental Corporate Transactions
The principal changes made by the 1984 Act with respect of fun-
damental corporate acquisitions are, by contrast to the changes
made to the rules governing ordinary distributions, minor. Two mi-
nor changes were made to the reorganization definitions. In the case
of a C reorganization a requirement was added to the definition that
the transferor corporation liquidate.304 In the case of a D reorganiza-
tion the definition was broadened to require ownership of only 50%
300. ALl Report, supra note 1, at 41-45.
301. Id. at 134-41.
302. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 633.
303. Lewis, Proposed New Treatment, supra note 79, at 1647-48.
304. 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 63.
of the controlled corporation and attribution of stock ownership was
provided. 30 5 Warrants were brought within the scope of the nonrec-
ognition rule previously governing transactions in its own stock by a
corporation. 30 6 Other changes were also of peripheral importance.3 07
None of these changes is likely to have a significant impact on a
wide range of corporate transactions.
Why Inaction?
The sources of inertia are various and also of varying importance.
Again, it is probably helpful to distinguish the procedural constraints
and the substantive constraints. At the substantive level, the opposi-
tion within the ABA Tax Section to the proposals which led, ulti-
mately, to the ABA Tax Section's inability to endorse the proposals
as a simplification project, obviously played a role in discouraging a
number of participants in the process.308 Yet it is difficult to believe
that the potential opposition from the ABA Tax Section caused any
serious political concern.309 The second substantive concern undoubt-
edly was the complexity of the project, and the difficulty in complet-
ing it in the first two years. Of course, that concern is relatively
weak. The Treasury Department has been charged with completely
reforming and simplifying the entire Federal income tax in a period
of ten months - less time (and probably with less staff) than the
corporate reform project had available to it. Nevertheless, the con-
cern emerged clearly at the October hearing.3 10
It is likely, however, that the principal concerns with including the
staff acquisition proposals as part of the 1984 Act were political,
rather than substantive. The lukewarn support of the Treasury at the
October hearing 11 and the subsequent willingness to defer these
questions until the Treasury's fundamental tax reform study is com-
305. Id. at § 64.
306. Id. at § 57.
307. E.g., 1984 Act, supra note 139, at § 65 (amendment to collapsible corpora-
tion rules); id. at §§ 75, 76 (recapture to certain partners upon disposition of partnership
interest).
308. 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101, at 85. The proposals also attracted a
great deal of attention and criticism at the February, 1984 Mid-Year meeting of the
ABA Tax Section. See Sheppard, ABA Tax Section Members Criticize Senate Finance
Corporate Proposals, 22 TAX NOTEs 756 (1984).
309. Thus, for example, the ABA Tax Section has repeatedly urged repeal of the
generation-skipping transfer tax without any apparent effect. See H.R. 1668, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H648 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983) (to repeal tax on generation-
skipping transfers); H.R. 1434, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H544 (daily ed.
Feb. 15, 1983) (same).
310. 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 101, at 174 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen
for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); id. at 187 (statement of Thomas P. Maletta for
Tax Executives Institute, Inc.).
311. Id. at 9 (statement of The Honorable Ronald A. Pearlman, Deputy Asst. for
Tax Policy, Dept. of Treasury).
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pleted, undoubtedly was the most important political barrier. Put an-
other way, those provisions from the Staff Report which were in-
cluded in the 1984 Act were those which received Treasury
support.312 In general, the Treasury supported only so-called loop-
hole closing and revenue raising reform measures.313 As a result, the
simplification measures fell out of the legislative package. The distri-
bution proposals, which generally included the reform, fared better
than the simplification proposals relating the acquisitions. In fine
irony, the Congress did split up the staff's proposals as many in the
ABA Tax Section had recommended.3 14 But the Congress jettisoned
the simplification, pro-taxpayer provisions, and enacted only the rev-
enue raising reform measures. 3 5
The Prospects For The Future
In August, 1984, a number of uncertainties make it difficult to
predict what the future of corporate tax reform will be in the next
Congress. Foremost are the political uncertainties which surround
the 1984 elections. Second, the Treasury fundamental tax reform
study is a great unknown. Third, whether the Congress will enact a
major revenue raising bill next year is just as uncertain. Neverthe-
less, let me conclude with a few retrospective and prospective com-
ments. First, despite the present, limited success in dealing legisla-
tively with the fundamental problems of corporate tax reform, that
failure establishes neither the ineluctable theoretical or political ne-
cessity of a complex corporate tax. There are right answers in corpo-
rate tax reform. The failure to enact all of them in 1984 by no
means establishes that the answers proposed by the ALI are wrong;
quite the contrary, there is a surprising consensus to a wide range of
the ALI's proposals.316 Neither does the failure to enact those pro-
posals in 1984 establish that they will not be enacted in 1985 or
1986. The failure of leadership by the ABA Tax Section by no
means establishes that the Congress will face significant political op-
312. Thus, the Treasury supported the repeal of General Utilities with respect to
ordinary distributions, the C and D reorganization changes, and the collapsible corpora-
tion changes, and they were enacted. See DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 24 at J-18
(Feb. 6, 1984).
313. DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 24 at J-19 (Feb. 6, 1984).
314. Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 638 (Minority Report).
315. Thus, none of the liberalizing changes to the reorganization definitions or
electivity were enacted, and all of the corporate tax changes made in 1984 are net reve-
nue producers.
316. This consensus was displayed among members of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee working group, for example.
position in enacting real, corporate tax reform, whatever its impact
on the ABA Tax Section's ability to proceed with its own legislative
agenda. At the same time, 1984 has confirmed the historic difficulty
in enacting structural, simplifying reform. But few of us ever
thought that the task was going to be easy.
